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daniel richman 
Federal Sentencing in 2007: 
The Supreme Court Holds—The Center Doesn’t  
abstract.   This essay takes stock of federal sentencing after 2007, the year of the periphery. 
On Capitol Hill, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales resigned in the face of widespread criticism 
over his role in the replacement of several U.S. Attorneys. In the Supreme Court, the trio of Rita 
v. United States, Gall v. United States, and Kimbrough v. United States clarified and perhaps 
extended the breadth of license given to district judges in an advisory guideline regime. In 
contrast to the Supreme Court’s sentencing cases, which focus on the allocation of authority 
between judges and juries, and the bulk of the sentencing literature, which pits prosecutors 
against judges, the institutional pairing highlighted here is Main Justice versus the districts, with 
Department of Justice (DOJ) sentencing policies since 2001 considered in the larger context of 
DOJ efforts to exercise power over U.S. Attorneys’ offices. What has often been framed as 
“judicial discretion” might better be seen as a coordinated exercise in local norm setting—an 
exercise in which line prosecutors, through charging power and shared control over investments 
in information gathering (in tandem with agencies) inevitably play a critical role. The extent to 
which prosecutors will be allowed to explicitly embrace the power they tacitly exercise already, 
and whether an illusory regime of sentencing uniformity will give way to a real one of 
collaborative norm articulation and development, remains to be seen. But the suggestion here is 
that the new sentencing cases may point the way to a healthier federal criminal justice system.  
author.   Professor, Columbia Law School. Many thanks to Alexandra Bowie, Madhu 
Chugh, Jerry Lynch, Gillian Metzger, Kate Stith, and Steve Thel for extremely helpful comments 
on prior drafts, and especially to Bill Stuntz for an enormously rewarding (and humbling) 
intellectual exchange that I hope will continue for a great many years.  
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introduction 
Last year will go down in the chronicles of federal criminal law as the year 
of the periphery. On Capitol Hill, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, 
dispatched from the White House to preside over the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), discovered to his chagrin that U.S. Attorneys can bite back—at least 
when Congress wants them to. After he resigned in the face of widespread 
legislative and public criticism over his role in the replacement of several U.S. 
Attorneys (among other things), his post was filled by Michael B. Mukasey, a 
Washington outsider with deep roots in the Southern District of New York.1 In 
the Supreme Court, the trio of Rita v. United States,2 Gall v. United States,3 and 
Kimbrough v. United States4 enshrined the reasonable district court as the 
ineffable place where federal criminal policy, sentencing philosophy, and 
individualized judgment merge. To be sure, a close reader might consider the 
trilogy simply an announcement that the Court meant what it said back in 2005 
when, relying on the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, it declared the 
hitherto mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be advisory in United 
States v. Booker.5 But reiteration befitted Booker, since the message of its two 
different majority opinions had yet to be fully assimilated by the Justice 
Department or the appellate law of many circuits. Now the discretionary 
license given to district courts across the country would be written in larger 
print. In a world with vanishingly few trials, the ultimate decentralized actor—
the jury—in whose name this line of cases started, has pretty much dropped 
out of the picture except in Justice David Souter’s Gall concurrence.6 The year 
thus presented a stark contrast between the toppling of the most centralized 
actor and the celebration of nearly the least. 
It is too early to predict precisely how the trio of cases will play out, or what 
the dynamic between Justice Department headquarters (the amalgam of 
political leadership and central bureaucracy often referred to as “Main 
 
1.  Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Philip Shenon, Bush To Appoint Ex-Judge as Head of Justice Dept., N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at 1. 
2.  127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). 
3.  128 S. Ct. 586 (2007). 
4.  128 S. Ct. 558 (2007). 
5.  543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
6.  Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 603 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]he best resolution of the tension 
between substantial consistency throughout the system and the right of jury trial” would be 
a scheme of mandatory guidelines that required “jury findings of all facts necessary to set 
the upper range of sentencing discretion.”). 
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Justice”7) and the U.S. Attorneys’ offices in the far-flung districts will be under 
Attorney General Mukasey or the next Administration. But it is the perfect time 
to think about the potential implications for the interaction of sentencing 
policy and the federal enforcement system. 
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s sentencing cases, which at least until 
recently focused on the allocation of authority between judges and juries, and 
the bulk of the sentencing literature, which pits prosecutors against judges, the 
institutional pairing I wish to highlight is Main Justice versus the districts. The 
story of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ought to be seen not just as an 
exercise in branch checking—of judges by the legislature, with help from 
prosecutors—but rather as part of a hierarchical project on the executive side 
whose contours and consequences were barely dreamed about at the outset. 
This project did not necessarily have to become intertwined with federal 
sentencing doctrine and practice. One could imagine a sentencing regulatory 
regime that gave free rein to prosecutorial discretion and focused only on 
judges. One could also imagine exertions of authority by the executive center 
that would not be expressed in sentencing policies. But intertwine the projects 
indeed did, and we are working through the fallout from their entanglement. 
One goal of this essay is to place the Justice Department’s recent sentencing 
policies within the larger context of the Department’s efforts to control U.S. 
Attorneys’ offices. A second goal, both normative and diagnostic, is to show the 
incoherence of those policies, at least when applied to that large part of the 
federal enforcement docket charging offenders normally prosecuted by state 
and local authorities. Indeed, the demand for consistency in how federal 
prosecutors handled those cases nationwide merely reinforced the most 
problematic aspect of the federal enforcement system—an unaccountability 
arising out of the insufficient demarcation of its responsibilities. A third goal is 
tentatively to celebrate the Supreme Court’s recent (re)establishment of 
reasonable judicial discretion as the touchstone of federal sentencing law. 
 One need not have special confidence in the wisdom of sentencing judges 
to join this celebration. Appreciation of prosecutorial competencies and 
capabilities should be enough. What has often been framed as “judicial 
discretion” might better be seen as a coordinate exercise in local norm setting—
an exercise in which line prosecutors, through charging power and shared 
control (with agencies) over investments in information gathering, inevitably 
play a critical role. Whether prosecutors will be allowed to embrace the power 
they tacitly exercise already, and whether an illusory regime of sentencing 
 
7.  See, e.g., JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE: THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO ENFORCE 
THE NATION’S CRIMINAL LAWS AND GUARD ITS LIBERTIES (1996). 
1374.1418.RICHMAN.DOC 5/22/2008 5:28:53 PM 
the yale law journal 117:1374   2008 
1378 
 
uniformity will give way to a real one of collaborative norm articulation and 
development, remains to be seen. But the suggestion here is that the new 
sentencing cases may point the way to a healthier federal criminal justice 
system—one in which prosecution and sentencing decisions become something 
more than an abstract exercise in number generation. 
Part I limns the Bush Administration’s centralization efforts at the Justice 
Department. While these efforts initially appeared aimed more at un-
decentralization, their direction was pretty clear even before the U.S. Attorney 
firings. Part II explores how the Administration’s centralization project 
intersected with its sentencing policy, each reinforcing the other, with the 
Sentencing Guidelines used as a tool of hierarchical control and the Attorney 
General’s authority deployed in service of the Guidelines. Part III takes a 
normative turn and explains how the Department’s sentencing policies, when 
promulgated against the backdrop of a federal docket largely anchored in local 
concerns, compounded the lack of consistency inherent in the system. Finally, 
Part IV explains how the Supreme Court’s cases, when coupled with changes in 
the Department’s political leadership and policies, may open up a new space for 
collaborative sentencing lawmaking at the district level. 
i. doj centralization under bush (i i )  
While the image of the overzealous prosecutor has its place in any doctrinal 
or institutional analysis of criminal justice pathologies, the risk of “shirking” 
looms as large here as in any other bureaucratic context. Prosecutors, and the 
agents or police officers they work with,8 decide what cases to pursue; decide 
how much evidence to gather; assess the strength of the resulting case file; and 
conduct the negotiations that, if successful, will produce a guilty plea obviating 
the need for a trial at which their work could be assessed by others. There 
might be prosecutors who sometimes hope that negotiations break down and 
trials ensue. Trials are rare commodities in the United States, and trial 
experience is eminently marketable.9 And there might be occasions in which a 
prosecutor prefers that a particular defendant gets a particularly high or low 
sentence. But the principal agency risk when it comes to sentencing is that, 
having threatened the highest sentence legally possible (or maybe even beyond 
 
8.  See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 749 (2003). 
9.  See Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of 
Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 627 (2005). 
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that), the prosecutor will treat sentence years as currency to be exchanged for a 
higher conviction rate and maybe even personal leisure.10 
This generic analysis extends across all U.S. jurisdictions. Yet the federal 
criminal enforcement system has its own special agency problems. The basic 
structure and its historical roots are just the beginning of the challenge. The 
bulk of federal prosecutions are brought by the ninety-four U.S. Attorneys’ 
offices, which are generally staffed by local professionals, many of whom will 
be leaving government service in the not-too-distant future.11 These offices—
which predate the Justice Department by nearly a hundred years—are headed 
by presidential appointees, who report (on paper at least) only to the Attorney 
General and his Deputy. Each appointee at least traditionally has had her own 
local power base, having been selected with considerable input from local 
political leaders.12 Cases come to these offices or are suggested by a wide range 
of agencies that include federal enforcement bureaus, whose field offices may 
have local ties of their own, and local police departments.13 And to add to these 
institutional design challenges is the very nature of federal criminal 
jurisdiction, which—with a few exceptional areas where federal responsibility 
for the “crime rate” is somewhat clear—confounds any effort to devise effective 
performance measures.14 
How have the federal enforcement bureaucracy’s political principals 
responded to this degree of “slack” in the system? On the legislative side, the 
response over the past few decades has generally been a mix of acquiescence 
and self-defensive embrace. Through oversight and targeted funding, Congress 
 
10.  See Manu Raghav, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, Convictions Versus Conviction 
Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice 14 (Mar. 30, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/prosecutors-raghav-ramseyer-rasmusen.pdf (noting how 
principals cannot know how many potential cases exist “and so have difficulty evaluating the 
number of convictions [a prosecutor] achieves, not to mention the average sentence for 
those convictions”). 
11.  See Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United States 
Attorneys’ Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 282-83 
(2002). 
12.  See JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL 
AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 35-53 (1978); H.W. Perry, Jr., United States Attorneys—Whom Shall They 
Serve?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 129, 138-39; Daniel C. Richman, Federal 
Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 
789-90 (1999).  
13.  Richman, supra note 8, at 767-78. 
14.  See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political 
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 611-15 (2005). 
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regularly tries to shape prosecutorial priorities.15 And the disclosures in the 
wake of the U.S. Attorney firings highlight the readiness of at least some 
legislators to be occasionally quite vocal in demanding zealous pursuit of 
certain cases or classes of cases.16 But, at least until recently, the dominant 
pattern in congressional activity vis-à-vis U.S. Attorneys’ offices has been to 
nurture their independence and their resistance to central control.17 
Efforts by the Chief Executive to exercise such control have varied from 
administration to administration. That George W. Bush’s Administration 
would be committed to increasing the authority of the Attorney General and 
his minions in Main Justice over U.S. Attorneys and their assistants was clear 
from the start, however, and over-determined. Certainly a relative increase in 
centralization was inevitable given the state of the Department at the end of 
President Clinton’s tenure. That Administration’s commitment to presidential 
authority, so nicely elucidated by Elena Kagan,18 found comparatively little 
expression in the federal criminal enforcement area. Indeed, the flip side of the 
wide berth that the Clinton White House left Attorney General Janet Reno in 
the wake of politically sensitive investigations became her political weakness in 
battles with Congress, the FBI, and others.19 One can fairly speculate that this 
 
15.  Richman, supra note 12, at 789-810 (describing the procedural and structural mechanisms 
through which Congress influences federal enforcement decision making). For a recent 
funding example, consider the Effective Corruption Prosecutions Act of 2007, S. 118, 110th 
Cong. (2007), introduced in the first days of the new 110th Congress by the new Senate 
Judiciary Committee chair, authorizing an annual appropriation of twenty-five million 
dollars for four years to “increase the number of personnel to investigate and prosecute 
public corruption offenses.” Id. § 4. 
16.  Justice Department documents indicate sustained efforts by Representatives Darrell Issa and 
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., to get U.S. Attorney Carol Lam to pursue more “coyote 
prosecutions.” E-mail from Carol Lam, U.S. Att’y, S.D. Cal., to Rebecca Seidel, Dep. Ass’t 
Att’y Gen. (Aug. 2, 2006), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Printshop.aspx?Section
=411 (DOJ document set six). Hearing testimony suggests that Senator Pete Domenici and 
Representative Heather Wilson of New Mexico badgered U.S. Attorney David Iglesias 
about a pending corruption investigation involving Democrats. See Kenneth Jost, Prosecutors 
and Politics: Has the Justice Department Become Too Political?, 17 CQ RESEARCHER 555, 558-59 
(2007).  
17.  See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 497 
(1996); Richman, supra note 12, at 807-10; see also Richard W. Waterman & Kenneth J. 
Meier, Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 173, 175 
(1998) (“In the institutional model, if a political principal such as the legislature decides that 
it is not in its rational self-interest to police or monitor its bureaucratic agents, that principal 
is unlikely to directly bear any cost incurred by the agent’s continued shirking.”). 
18.  Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). 
19.  See Lincoln Caplan, Hyper Hacks: What’s Really Wrong with the Bush Justice Department, 
SLATE, Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2161804/ (noting that the departure of 
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lack of political clout affected the Department’s authority over the districts. 
What is clear, though, is that there were few conspicuous assertions of that 
authority.20 
Moreover, the Clinton Justice Department’s enforcement priorities 
themselves engendered a devolution of power. A federal focus on violent crime 
will not always come with a commitment to increased district authority. 
Indeed, case-counting from Washington became a hallmark of the 
“accountability” measures in Project Safe Neighborhood, the Bush 
Administration’s national gun violence program.21 However, as federal 
enforcement agencies lack the manpower and informational resources to go 
after episodic criminal activity, and therefore depend on local police 
departments in this regard, the extent of the Reno Justice Department’s 
commitment to violent crime itself had a centrifugal effect.22 Gun possession 
cases, car-jackings, or street drug sales will rarely come to federal agents unless 
the local police make the arrests and turn over the defendants. That effect was 
magnified by the frankness and enthusiasm with which the Department ceded 
control of its “Anti-Violent Crime Initiative” to the districts and celebrated 
 
Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell and “the arrival of the Whitewater scandal 
loosened the department’s political leash”); David S. Cloud, Polite Prosecutor: The Attorney 
General Gets Little Respect; What’s Her Problem?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2000, at A1; Jeffrey 
Goldberg, What Is Janet Reno Thinking?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 16; 
Diana R. Gordon, Can Reno Be the People’s Lawyer? Justice Watch, NATION, Mar. 21, 1994, at 
370; John F. Harris & David A. Vise, With Freeh, Mistrust Was Mutual, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 
2001, at A1; Melinda Henneberger, As Pressure Builds, Reno Appears Calm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
4, 1999, at A9; David A. Vise & Lorraine Adams, Hatch, Reno, and the “Palace Guard,” 
WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1999, at A29; David A. Vise & Lorraine Adams, Revelations Inflame 
Rift Between Justice Dept. and FBI, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1999, at A3; see also Richman, supra 
note 8, at 773 n.110. 
20.  Two Clinton Administration U.S. Attorneys resigned under fire, one after being videotaped 
grabbing a television reporter by the throat and the other “amid accusations that he bit a 
topless dancer on the arm during a visit to an adult club after losing a big drug case.” KEVIN 
M. SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE SERVED LESS THAN FULL 
FOUR-YEAR TERMS, 1981-2006, at 6-7 (2007) (quoting Associated Press, U.S. Attorney 
Resigns amid Turmoil, TULSA WORLD, May 18, 1996, at A13), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33889_20070222.pdf. 
21.  For examples of intense case-counting by the DOJ, see USAO District Review, Project Safe 
Neighborhoods 24-28 (Mar. 6, 2006), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Printshop.aspx
?Section=411 (DOJ document set one). 
22.  See Daniel C. Richman, “Project Exile” and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 
43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 378 (2001). 
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heterogeneous district strategies.23 Indeed, the Reno Justice Department went 
further, allowing even international terrorism cases to be primarily run out of 
the districts—principally the Southern District of New York.24 
The new management style of the Bush/Ashcroft Justice Department was 
not simply a response to the reduced baseline of the prior administration, 
however. It also reflected an embrace of unitary executive theory that both 
justified and presaged a broad-based effort to subordinate all prosecutorial 
decision making to centralized control.25 And it was of a piece with the Bush 
White House’s efforts in other areas of executive policy.26 
Evidence that the Bush Administration would be tightening the reins on 
the districts came early, although it was not overwhelming. Following the 
precedent set by the Clinton Administration in 1993, though with somewhat 
less speed,27 the Administration asked for the resignations of nearly all the U.S. 
Attorneys.28 The number of replacement appointees with ties closer to the 
 
23.  Id. at 378-83; see also OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, PROMISING STRATEGIES TO REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE (1999), available at 
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/gun_violence/173950.pdf. 
24.  See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 71-74 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/
911Report_Ch3.pdf; ANDREW C. MCCARTHY, WILLFUL BLINDNESS: A MEMOIR OF THE JIHAD 
(2008).  
25.  For explorations of the theory and its ramifications, see, for example, Steven G. Calabresi & 
Saikrishna Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); 
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, 
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional 
Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225; and Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief 
Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (2005). For critiques of the theory, see Susan Low 
Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning 
There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561; Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal 
Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275 (1989); and Lawrence 
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
26.  See Sidney M. Milkis & Jesse H. Rhodes, George W. Bush, the Republican Party, and the 
“New” American Party System, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 461, 472 (2007) (“Already executive-centered 
in its approach to politics and policy, the Bush White House became even more insulated 
from Congress and the Republican Party as it planned and fought the war against 
terrorism.”); see also Tim Conlan & John Dinan, Federalism, the Bush Administration, and the 
Transformation of American Conservativism, 37 PUBLIUS 279, 280 (2007); Stuart Shapiro, An 
Evaluation of the Bush Administration Reforms to the Regulatory Process, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. 
Q. 270 (2007). 
27.  See David Johnston, Attorney General Seeks Resignations from Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
24, 1993, at A1. 
28.  See Andy Newman, White House Seeks Resignations of 3 Prosecutors in New York, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 16, 2001, at B3. 
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White House than to local power bases was interesting but not remarkable. So 
too was the stature of the new Criminal Division head, Michael Chertoff.29 
The Department’s response to Enron’s collapse and other financial debacles 
made clear that Washington would not always prevail—or at least that 
Washington could be persuaded of the virtues of decentralization in some 
areas. In July 2002 with great fanfare, President Bush announced the formation 
of the Corporate Fraud Task Force.30 What was most noteworthy about this 
“Task Force” was what it was not. Although a team of Assistant U.S. Attorneys 
(AUSAs) was brought together under Criminal Division supervision to pursue 
the Enron investigations and any prosecutions flowing therefrom, corporate 
fraud cases generally would still be handled by U.S. Attorneys’ offices in much 
the same way as before. More than anything, the Task Force was a branding 
device that allowed the Administration to take political credit for the far-flung 
activities of the districts without taking on much responsibility or operational 
control.31 
However, the creation of the Corporate Fraud Task Force occurred against 
the backdrop of 9/11—an extraordinary shock to the federal system and one 
that implicated or could be claimed to have implicated national security 
concerns in all future interactions between Washington and the districts.32 
Terrorism prevention would now be at the top of the Department’s priorities 
and would exert considerable centripetal force.33 Even as they recognized the 
coordinating role that U.S. Attorneys’ offices would have to play in the creation 
 
29.  See David Johnston, Bush Chooses Chief for Federal Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at 
A23. 
30.  See David E. Sanger, Bush, on Wall St., Offers Tough Stance, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at A1 
(reporting that President Bush announced that the Corporate Fraud Task Force would 
“function as a financial crimes SWAT team”). 
31.  See David Johnston, The Task Force; Big Names but No Authority To Prosecute, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 10, 2002, at C6 (“[L]aw enforcement officials said that the new unit would have little 
effect on how corporate crime is investigated by the F.B.I. and the Justice Department.”); 
David Voreacos & Bob Van Voris, Bush Fraud Probes Jail Corporate Criminals Less Than Two 
Years, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103
&sid=awztp90u5kEo&refer=us# (recounting that Main Justice officials involved in the 
Corporate Task Force recall that they “closely tracked cases, advising on tactics and sending 
Justice Department prosecutors from Washington to help U.S. attorneys nationwide”). 
32.  Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 
377, 408 (2006).  
33.  See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 618-19; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S 
REPRIORITIZATION EFFORTS, AUDIT REPORT 05-37 (2005), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0537/final.pdf. 
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of a domestic intelligence “network,”34 Justice officials worked hard to run the 
operation from the top. 
Although there is no clear evidence that the Bush Administration initially 
selected U.S. Attorneys with an eye toward centralized control, there is 
evidence it started doing so by Bush’s second term once Alberto Gonzales 
became Attorney General.35 As for the firings that occurred in late 2006, it is 
hard to assess actual causation based on the current state of the evidence.36 Not 
only does there appear to be a different story behind each firing, but some of 
the stories, particularly those of Carol Lam in San Diego and David Iglesias in 
New Mexico, involved exertions of power by local legislators.37 Nonetheless, 
the available evidence does depict a significant level of dissatisfaction on the 
part of DOJ apparatchiks with efforts by the fired U.S. Attorneys to exercise 
and extend decentralized authority. In Arizona, Paul Charlton had the temerity 
to seek reconsideration of the determination that the death penalty be sought 
in one of his cases.38 In Washington State, John McKay annoyed Main Justice 
officials by touting a local intelligence-sharing network.39 And there was some 
 
34.  See Richman, supra note 32, at 408. 
35.  See Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Prosecutor Posts Go to Bush Insiders; Less Preference Shown 
for Locals, Senators’ Choices, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2007, at A1 (“About one-third of the nearly 
four dozen U.S. attorney’s jobs that have changed hands since President Bush began his 
second term have been filled by the White House and the Justice Department with trusted 
administration insiders.”). But see Andrew Rudalevige & David E. Lewis, Parsing the 
Politicized Presidency: Centralization and Politicization as Presidential Strategies for 
Bureaucratic Control (Sept. 1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www
.princeton.edu/~delewis/Papers/rudalevigelewis.pdf (suggesting that centralization and 
politicization are substitute, not complementary, strategies). 
36.  Without the baseline that the e-mail traffic involving retained U.S. Attorneys would 
provide, it is hard to tell whether the policy conflicts revealed in the e-mail traffic relating to 
the fired U.S. Attorneys were relatively serious or similarly provided post hoc justifications. 
Further light doubtlessly will be shed on the firings by any report that emerges out of the 
pending joint investigation by the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector General and 
Office of Professional Responsibility.  
37.  Although the legislators involved seem to have given little thought to the matter, efforts by 
local politicians to recruit Washington’s muscle to serve local political ends may well 
undermine the long-term institutional interests of Congress. See Richman, supra note 12, at 
808 (noting Congress’s “appreciation of decentralized authority”); see also DAVID E. LEWIS, 
PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 28-29 (2003) (discussing the 
congressional calculus with respect to the insulation of agencies from presidential control). 
38.  See Richard A. Serrano, Listing Reasons for the Firings, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, at A18. 
39.  See Paul Shukovsky, Ex-U.S. Attorney McKay Was Forced To Resign, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 8, 2007, at B1; see also John McKay, Train Wreck at the Justice 
Department, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 265, 278-79 (2008); Richman, supra note 32, at 423 
(describing program). 
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dissatisfaction in Washington with Carol Lam’s failure to hit the right number 
of immigration cases.40 
One cannot speak in definitively comparative terms because no other recent 
Justice Department leadership has suffered the compelled disclosure of so 
broad a range of internal communications. Yet it is hard to peruse the hearing 
testimony and the documents released in connection with the legislative probes 
of the U.S. Attorney firings without getting the overwhelming impression that 
what may have begun as a response to Attorney General Reno’s policies had, 
under Alberto Gonzales, developed into a concerted effort to rein in district 
initiative and authority. 
ii. “uniformity” in federal sentencing: the executive 
perspective 
Although most critiques of the Bush Administration’s sentencing policies 
have focused on how they affected the allocation of authority between judges 
and prosecutors, the Department’s sustained campaign against judicial 
sentencing discretion also ought to be seen in the context of the executive 
centralization project just described. If Washington were to tame the districts, 
it would need a mechanism of control far more pervasive than the replacement 
of allegedly recalcitrant political appointees. In this effort, the Bush 
Administration found itself a willing partner in Congress, and an alluring tool 
in Congress’s commitment to the notion of “uniformity” in federal sentencing. 
Having given scant thought to which cases within the ever-growing 
jurisdiction of federal enforcers ought to be pursued, Congress had nonetheless 
decided that it wanted “uniformity” in their handling. Such was the message of 
the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984.41 To be sure, the SRA also reflected 
the same distrust of judges and their characteristic leniency that inspired the 
statutory mandatory minimum provisions that began to proliferate in the late 
1980s. But there is no reason to doubt Congress’s commitment to uniformity—
albeit an extremely thin notion of uniformity, one that made no attempt to 
limit executive decisions about which cases to prosecute but simply sought to 
ensure that similar defendants so selected would be treated similarly. 
 
40.  But see Q & A: Legal Matters with Carol Lam, STAN. LAW., Fall 2007, at 24, 27 (quoting Lam 
recalling DOJ satisfaction with her focus on alien smuggling organizations instead of 
individual illegal re-entry cases). 
41.  Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (2000); 28 
U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2000)). 
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As Kate Stith notes, the Sentencing Guidelines and the statutory 
mandatory minimum provisions with which they were intertwined certainly 
created the potential for a vast transfer of discretionary power from judges to 
line prosecutors.42 The new scheme was supposed to constrain prosecutors as 
well. Although they would still have the ability either not to bring a case or to 
drop it thereafter, the purpose of the modified real offense sentencing approach 
of the Guidelines was to limit prosecutorial leverage in plea negotiations by 
requiring judges to base a defendant’s sentence on all relevant conduct, not just 
the subset of it specified by the prosecutor.43 But this was not to be, as judges 
largely abandoned the field to the parties and particularly to prosecutors. Stith 
has elsewhere explained:  
Probation officers soon learned that it is time-consuming and often 
unproductive to attempt to learn “facts” from sources other than the 
attorneys in the case, while judges generally had no interest in forcing 
the parties to prove or disprove ‘facts’ that neither party wanted the 
sentence to be based upon.44 
With substantial control over the flow of offense-related facts to the judge, 
and even over the investment of resources in the discovery of facts to begin 
with, prosecutors were left with unprecedented sway over sentencing. 
Yet even as judges chafed at having their hands tied by a regime that left 
line prosecutors free to manipulate sentences, the Justice Department 
leadership came to see the regime as a means of regulating those same line 
prosecutors. Those decrying the increase in prosecutorial power caused by the 
Guidelines project often forget that, particularly in the federal system, 
prosecutorial power is not monolithic. And what to judges seemed like a 
constraint on their discretion could also be viewed as an effort to constrain 
 
42.  Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE 
L.J. 1420, 1434 (2008); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1338-39 (2005) (describing 
mechanisms through which prosecutors could exercise discretionary authority). 
43.  See Julie R. O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense 
System, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1342, 1359-60 (1997); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison 
Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 
244 (2005) (describing relevant conduct rules “designed to ensure that prosecutors did not 
manipulate their control of the facts into absolute control over sentencing outcomes”); 
David Yellen, Just Deserts and Lenient Prosecutors: The Flawed Case for Real-Offense Sentencing, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1434, 1435 (1997) (noting that the scheme might “negate undercharging 
by prosecutors”). 
44.  Kate Stith, United States v. Mistretta: The Constitution and the Sentencing Guidelines, in 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 455, 472 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).  
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prosecutors, with the judges involuntarily enlisted as monitors on behalf of 
prosecutorial hierarchs in service of centralization of executive power.45 
Herein lay the promise of the Guidelines as an executive management tool: 
with the inflexibility of the scheme would come a degree of “legibility”46 
hitherto unimaginable in the system. Perhaps now an interested observer—be 
she a supervisor, legislator, or member of the public—would be able to tell how 
much of a “bargain” a plea deal was. To be sure, as seems inevitable in all such 
top-down legibility projects,47 the data demanded and presumably generated 
by the Guidelines would not capture all the local knowledge of the courtroom 
“workgroup.”48 And if all the members of the group—judge, prosecutor, and 
defense counsel—colluded to give a defendant an inordinately deep discount, 
the record might not reveal it. But collusion might become rarer over time. 
Having had their own hands tied, judges might not be so ready to help 
renegade prosecutors circumvent the system. The scheme thus seemed to offer 
a new degree of transparency and perhaps even a metric for assessing 
negotiated dispositions. Even if the outsider could not necessarily assess the 
justification for the discount—since, for instance, the constitutionality of a 
stop, search, or confession could have been contestable—she could at least 
recognize it as one. 
Kate Stith adeptly tells how, from the start, the Justice Department became 
a cosponsor of the Sentencing Guideline project, in service of some mix of 
executive and legislative goals. Attorney General Thornburgh was quite clear in 
demanding adherence in the field to both the letter and the spirit of the 
Sentencing Guidelines. In keeping with her management style, Attorney 
General Reno allowed the districts and line prosecutors somewhat more 
discretion.49 The change from Reno to Ashcroft was particularly dramatic. One 
is hard pressed to figure out the degree to which the sentencing policies of the 
Bush (II) Administration followed from its commitment to hierarchical 
 
45.  See Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 
2055-57 (2006); Jeffery T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer, The Use and Transformation of Formal 
Decision-Making Criteria: Sentencing Guidelines, Organizational Contexts, and Case Processing 
Strategies, 45 SOC. PROBS. 248, 262-65 (1998) (discussing how state sentencing guidelines 
can be used by a district attorney’s office as a management tool). 
46.  JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN 
CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998) (exploring measurement, mapping, and other devices 
deployed by states to make activities and relationships more “legible,” and thus more 
amenable to control). I thank Peter Schuck for directing me to Scott’s work. 
47.  Id. at 44. 
48.  See JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF 
CRIMINAL COURTS 20 (1991). 
49.  Stith, supra note 42, at 1441.  
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control. Perhaps the arrow went in the other direction, with commitment to 
sentencing uniformity sparking increased interest in hierarchical control. In 
any event, the two projects dovetailed nicely. 
Consider the story of the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act of 
2003,50 which tightened the appellate standard of review for all departures 
from the Sentencing Guidelines, and in particular, called on the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission to reduce the incidence of downward departures. 
Perhaps because the measure required the DOJ “to take a more aggressive role 
in policing guidelines compliance and resisting downward departures ‘not 
supported by the facts and the law,’”51 the Amendment is generally portrayed 
as a legislative initiative, albeit one with considerable DOJ support.52 
Particularly in hindsight, however, the measure might be better characterized 
as a DOJ project in which congressional allies willingly joined. The sponsor, 
Congressman Tom Feeney (R-Fla.), appears to have been carrying water for a 
drafting group that included Justice Department officials and a former AUSA 
working for House Judiciary Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. When that 
aide later resigned after improperly using his boss’s name in a letter asking that 
a drug defendant receive a higher sentence, four senior DOJ officials intervened 
to get him hired as an AUSA in the District of Columbia.53 Here, as on other 
 
50.  Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
51.  See Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 749, 789 (2006) (quoting PROTECT Act § 401(l)(1), 117 Stat. at 674). 
52.  See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial 
Power To Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (2004). But see Frank O. Bowman, 
III, No Time for Judges: With Feeney Amendment, Justice Department Seeks Control of Federal 
Sentencing, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003, at 67 (noting the extent to which Congress was a 
cat’s paw for the DOJ).  
53.  See Michael Gerber, Down with Discretion, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2004, at 72, 74 (“The 
primary author of the Feeney Amendment is Jay Apperson, who worked . . . in the Virginia 
U.S. attorney’s office for a decade before becoming one of Kenneth Starr’s deputies in the 
independent counsel’s office that investigated the Clintons . . . . As an aide to F. James 
Sensenbrenner, the 13-term Republican congressman from Wisconsin who chairs the House 
Judiciary Committee, Apperson drafted a bill to reduce judicial discretion and lengthen 
sentences. He worked closely with Justice Department lawyers.”); Carol D. Leonnig, Hiring 
Process Was Bypassed for Prosecutor, WASH. POST, May 8, 2007, at A4 (“When he was counsel 
to a House subcommittee in 2005, Jay Apperson resigned after writing a letter to a federal 
judge in his boss’s name, demanding a tougher sentence for a drug courier . . . . [But] when 
Apperson was looking for a job recently [after working in the interim for a Senate 
Republican], four senior Justice Department officials urged Jeffrey A. Taylor, the top federal 
prosecutor for the District of Columbia, to hire him. Taylor did, and allowed him to skip the 
rigorous vetting process that the vast majority of career federal prosecutors face.”); Jeffrey 
Rosen, The Court’s Fancy Footwork: Breyer Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 2005, at 10 
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occasions in which the precise executive role has not been obvious,54 
congressional activity ranged somewhere between abdication and 
acquiescence.55 
This is not to suggest that the Feeney Amendment itself was at odds with 
demonstrated legislative interests. It was quite consistent with Congress’s 
commitment to the Guidelines project, with its substantial disregard for the 
value of judicial discretion, and with its tradition of providing enforcement 
resources to federal prosecutors at the lowest cost (to the fisc, at least).56 After 
all, the provision was primarily about judicial discretion, and by limiting 
judges’ ability to depart from Guidelines calculations that reflected a high 
degree of prosecutorial input, it essentially endowed prosecutors with 
additional bargaining power that could be flexed for more and speedier 
dispositions. 
Once one recognizes the Justice Department’s role in the Feeney 
Amendment, other features of that measure are similarly redolent of the 
Department’s willful conflation of sentencing and centralization policies. 
Consider the provision that conditioned further use of “fast-track” programs—
used in a number of hard-pressed districts to obtain speedy dispositions and 
broad waivers, generally in immigration cases, by offering extraordinarily 
lenient sentences—on explicit permission from the Attorney General.57 Perhaps 
the measure was simply an effort to give “legitimacy and legislative support to 
 
(suggesting that the Feeney Amendment was “[l]argely drafted by the Ashcroft Justice 
Department”). 
54.  See Doo-Rae Kim, Political Control and Bureaucratic Autonomy Revisited: A Multi-Institutional 
Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 33, 34 (2008) (“[E]mpirical 
research into regulatory behavior has traditionally underestimated the importance of joint 
actions among political principals to an agency.”). 
55.  See Keith E. Whittington & Daniel P. Carpenter, Executive Power in American Institutional 
Development, 1 PERSP. POL. 495 (2003) (noting the need for scholars to go beyond models of 
legislative abdication and delegation to consider acquiescence). 
56.  See O’Hear, supra note 51, at 786-90 (discussing the legislative intent behind the Feeney 
Amendment); see also Max Schanzenbach, Have Federal Judges Changed Their Sentencing 
Practices? The Shaky Empirical Foundations of the Feeney Amendment, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (2005).  
57.  See Albert Llosas Barrueco, Fast-Tracking United States v. Booker: Why Judges Should Not 
Fix Fast Track Disparities, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 65, 75 (2006); Evan W. Bolla, An 
Unwarranted Disparity: Granting Fast-Track Departures in Non-Fast-Track Districts, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 895 (2006); Michael M. O’Hear, Localization and Transparency in 
Sentencing: Reflections on the New Early Disposition Departure, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 357 (2004); 
Charging, Plea, and Early Disposition Policies Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n (2003) (statement 
of Paul Charlton, U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
hearings/9_23_03/Charlton.pdf.  
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an already existing practice.”58 But it can also be seen as an effort by Main 
Justice to prevent U.S. Attorneys’ offices from responding to local conditions 
or drifting away from departmental priorities—an effort that would essentially 
recruit sentencing judges as monitors in service of top-down regulation. 
So too with the Ashcroft Memorandum, promulgated six months after the 
passage of the Feeney Amendment. In it, the Attorney General enjoined all 
federal prosecutors to “charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable 
offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case, except as 
authorized by an Assistant Attorney General, United States Attorney, or 
designated supervisory attorney” in certain limited circumstances.59 Moreover, 
“if readily provable facts are relevant to calculations under the Sentencing 
Guidelines, the prosecutor must disclose them to the court,” because 
prosecutors could not “‘fact bargain,’ or be party to any plea agreement that 
results in the sentencing court having less than a full understanding of all 
readily provable facts.”60 The Memorandum can be seen as a laudable effort to 
even-handedly constrain prosecutors to the same extent as judges, binding 
both actors to the available facts and the Guidelines calculations that flow from 
them.61 But it also fit nicely with departmental efforts to reduce consideration 
of local realities in the districts. 
Even the now infamous provision in the 2006 USA PATRIOT Act 
reauthorization that changed the procedures for the appointment of interim 
U.S. Attorneys62 may have reflected parallel sentencing and political control 
goals, as well as utter congressional acquiescence in an executive project. The 
measure certainly strengthened the hands of the Attorney General and the 
White House in firing and replacing U.S. Attorneys. Previously, if the new 
U.S. Attorney whom the Attorney General had picked to fill a vacancy had not 
been confirmed by the Senate within 120 days, the district court could appoint 
someone else. The new legislation “repeal[ed] the authority of the court and 
 
58.  Barrueco, supra note 57, at 75. 
59.  Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm. 
60.  Id. 
61.  See Bibas, supra note 52, at 301-02 (“[T]he many critics of Ashcroft’s new restrictions on plea 
bargaining fail to see how they actually improve the balance of power. By limiting charge 
bargaining, he is limiting line prosecutors’ arbitrariness and partially offsetting the Feeney 
Amendment’s lopsidedness.”). 
62.  USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 502, 
120 Stat. 192, 246 (2006) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 546 (2000)). The provision has since been 
amended via the Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-
34, § 2, 121 Stat. 224 (2007). 
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permit[ted] the Attorney General’s temporary designee to serve until the 
vacancy [had been] filled by confirmation and appointment.”63 Yet according 
to Daniel Collins, for whom the move to allow interim U.S. Attorneys to stay 
in their posts indefinitely was a pet project while at the Justice Department, it 
was judicial anger at the Feeney Amendment that led him to push for 
eliminating judges from the interim appointments process.64 The 
Department’s then-congressional liaison, William Moschella, got a staffer on 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, Brett Tolman, to slip the provision into the 
USA PATRIOT Act reauthorization. Tolman thereafter was appointed U.S. 
Attorney for Utah.65 
So how does one determine what role centralization goals have played in 
the Department’s sentencing policies? Institutional mind-reading is always a 
challenge. Sometimes one can work backwards and presume intentionality 
from the natural result of a program. But this line of reasoning does not go far 
when dealing with measures that no informed observer would expect to be 
very successful. Any theoretical model would predict that the informational 
costs on this hierarchical control project would be prohibitive.66 And a 
practitioner would agree. As Frank Bowman has noted: “the experience of the 
 
63.  BRIAN T. YEH & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., USA PATRIOT IMPROVEMENT 
AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 49 (updated Dec. 21, 2006), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33332.pdf. 
64.  See Chitra Ragavan, Change in Naming Interim U.S. Attorneys Was Benign, Former Justice 
Official Says, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 12, 2007, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/
news/articles/070412/12gonzales.htm. 
65.  See id.; see also E-mail Correspondence Between William Moschella, Brett Tolman & Daniel 
Collins (assorted dates), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Media/pdfs/dag1990-
2062.pdf (DOJ document set three). 
66.  See John T. Scholz, Jim Twombly & Barbara Headrick, Street-Level Political Controls over 
Federal Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 829, 847 (1991) (finding, based on a study of 
county-level enforcement activities of the federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, that “[t]he inevitable discretion of street-level bureaucrats occurs even in 
enforcement agencies, despite the volumes of regulations that govern their behavior and 
sophisticated management information systems that monitor their activities”). The 
management control problems faced by the Justice Department would not be surprising to 
anyone familiar with large bureaucracies. See Martin Landau & Russell Stout, Jr., To Manage 
Is Not To Control: Or the Folly of Type II Errors, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 148, 152 (1979) (“The 
history of American bureaucracy instructs us that efforts to ‘impose’ control and ‘force’ 
compliance lead to disaster.”); Paul A. Sabatier, John Loomis & Catherine McCarthy, 
Hierarchical Controls, Professional Norms, Local Constituencies, and Budget Maximization: An 
Analysis of U.S. Forest Service Planning Decisions, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 204, 207 (1995) (“[T]op 
officials have less control over ‘street-level bureaucrats’ than the Progressives envisioned . . . 
particularly when field officials are professionals whose job commitment is contingent upon 
their ability to exercise substantial discretion.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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last decade, during which variants of the same policy [regarding charging and 
accepting pleas to only the most serious provable offense] have always been in 
place, strongly suggests that the Justice Department cannot meaningfully 
restrain local United States Attorney’s Offices from adopting locally convenient 
plea bargaining practices.”67 
The best evidence of the challenges to top-down management comes from 
federal death penalty cases, where the Department’s commitment to national 
uniformity long predates the Ashcroft Memorandum. A very large proportion 
of homicides in the United States, including those committed in connection 
with drug trafficking, racketeering, civil rights offenses, and even some 
robberies, can potentially be charged federally with a death sentence sought. 
Yet comparatively few are. Since 1988, when the federal death penalty was 
reinstated, the Attorney General has authorized its use against only 435 
defendants.68 Until 1994, the Attorney General would not consider a case 
unless a U.S. Attorney’s office had decided that the death penalty would be 
appropriate. Thereafter, in an effort to ensure greater uniformity in 
administration, the federal protocol was revised to require that federal 
prosecutors submit for review by the Attorney General all cases in which the 
death penalty could have been sought based on the federal offenses being 
charged, regardless of whether the U.S. Attorney wished to seek that penalty.69 
Attorney General Reno also directed a study of demographic and geographic 
differences in the 682 such “death-eligible” cases that had been submitted by 
U.S. Attorneys’ offices for review between January 1995 and July 2000.70 Upon 
finding ethnic minorities overrepresented in these 682 cases, Attorney General 
Reno went one step further and directed that the universe of inquiry be 
expanded to include cases in which a death-eligible charge would have been 
factually supportable but had not been brought. Attorney General Ashcroft, 
 
67.  Frank O. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing 
After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 193; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The 
Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 113-14 (2005). 
68.  See Dick Burr, David Bruck & Kevin McNally, Fed. Death Penalty Res. Counsel Project, An 
Overview of the Federal Death Penalty Process (Apr. 1, 2008), http://capdefnet.org/fdprc/
contents/shared_files/docs/1__overview_of_fed_death_process.asp. Determining the 
appropriate denominator to use for this numerator is, as will be seen, a daunting question.  
69.  See STEPHEN P. KLEIN, RICHARD A. BERK & LAURA J. HICKMAN, RAND CORP., RACE AND THE 
DECISION TO SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY IN FEDERAL CASES 3 (2006); Rory K. Little, The 
Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 406-40 (1999).  
70.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL SURVEY 
1988-2000 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/_dp_survey_final.pdf 
(looking only at death-eligible cases). 
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who had assumed the leadership of the Department in the interim, issued a 
report on the cases in this expanded universe, and directed that efforts be made 
to assess how this universe was constructed.71 
The problem is that the truly relevant universe—that of homicide cases that 
could be pursued federally but usually are not—is not so amenable to study and 
regulation. The best a recent qualitative study commissioned by the Justice 
Department could do was to draw on “the analogy of a window that is cracked 
open (or slammed shut) to let in homicide cases.”72 It further observed that 
“the degree to which the window to federal involvement is open depends on 
two conditions: openness of both local and federal authorities to potential 
federal involvement and interaction and coordination between them.”73 
Emphasizing the extent to which local authorities played a gatekeeping role, 
the study noted: “One city adamantly refused federal assistance with homicides 
or local crimes in general, while a neighboring city had learned to use federal 
assistance and capabilities as an integral part of both law enforcement and 
prosecutorial practices.”74 
Under Attorneys General Ashcroft and Gonzales, the Justice Department’s 
quest for strict horizontal equity and “uniformity” in capital cases was 
accompanied by a readiness to overrule local decision making75—a readiness 
that may have contributed to the firing of several of the U.S. Attorneys.76 
There is, however, an essential incoherence in the notion of “uniformity” when 
the universe of potential federal cases has never been prespecified, and when 
decisions to put homicide cases on the federal radar screen are so idiosyncratic. 
It is not altogether meaningless to command that a subordinate treat like cases 
alike, yet give her untrammeled discretion about what becomes a “case.” But it 
comes close. 
 
71.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA, 
ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE REVIEW (2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm.  
72.  PHYLLIS J. NEWTON, CANDACE M. JOHNSON & TIMOTHY M. MULCAHY, NAT’L OPINION 
RESEARCH GROUP, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF HOMICIDE CASES IN THE U.S.: THE 
PROCESS FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT 40 (2006), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/214753.pdf. 
73.  Id. at 41. 
74.  Id. at 43. 
75.  For a critique, see John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney 
General Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1697 (2003). 
76.  See Jost, supra note 16; Richard A. Serrano, Tom Hamburger & Ralph Vartabedian, At 
Justice, Life-and-Death Frictions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2007, at A10. 
1374.1418.RICHMAN.DOC 5/22/2008 5:28:53 PM 
the yale law journal 117:1374   2008 
1394 
 
The Justice Department’s Guidelines project represented an effort to scale 
up this quixotic quest for uniformity from capital cases to all cases. The level of 
monitoring would be far lower outside the capital context. But the intense 
focus on what made it onto the federal radar screen, and concomitant disregard 
for what never did was the same. Indeed, the project’s chance of success might 
be underestimated by those who do not consider how organizational cultures 
can change. Life-tenured judges had, over time and through self-selection, 
become increasingly inured to the way the Guidelines and mandatory 
minimums cut to the heart of what their predecessors saw as the judge’s role.77 
Surely it was not far-fetched to expect that hierarchically-controlled line 
prosecutors with far shorter tenures would soon begin thinking that cases came 
into the office with sentences attached to them, at least where the prosecutor 
did little to develop the cases herself. 
Then came Booker, which struck at the core of the uniformity project by 
relieving sentencing judges of the obligation to adhere to the Guidelines. 
In the immediate aftermath of Booker, the DOJ’s chief stratagem was to 
pretend nothing had happened. A memo to all federal prosecutors enjoined 
them to “take all steps necessary to ensure adherence to the sentencing 
guidelines.”78 The Department’s position led one district judge to complain 
that “the executive branch [was] continuing to campaign for . . . a supposedly 
scientific equation of justice, without mentioning the wholly unscientific and 
overwhelming discretion it exercises over the sums that equation produces.”79 
He went on to chide “the executive” for wanting “to be prosecutor and judge” 
and for “arbitrarily claim[ing] that any sum lesser than what it contrives is 
unreasonable and contrary to law.”80 In an apparent response to this sort of 
resistance, and to the post-Booker legal uncertainty, Attorney General Gonzales 
 
77.  See Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Decisions of 
Federal Judges?, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 231 (2004); David M. Zlotnick, Republican Appointees 
and Judicial Discretion: Case Studies from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Era (June 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/OSI-Report-
june2007.pdf.  
78.  Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. James B. Comey to All Federal Prosecutors (Jan. 28, 
2005), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/dag_jan
_28_comey_memo_on_booker.pdf; see also Laurie P. Cohen, Justice Department Is Pressuring 
Judges on Sentencing Guidelines, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2005, at A4. 
79.  United States v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding a guidelines 
sentence inappropriate in part because of the disparity between crack and powder cocaine 
sentences), vacated, 456 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2006). 
80.  Id.  
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went further and proposed turning the Guidelines into mandatory 
minimums.81 
The change of party control in Congress and the flap over the U.S. 
Attorney firings have taken a toll on the Department’s efforts, however. The 
Department’s principal legislative goal these days is to avoid the retroactive 
application of the new crack cocaine guidelines.82 Any plans for undoing Booker 
have at least been put in abeyance. With a likely lull on the legislative and 
executive sides, this is a good time to reassess the project. 
iii. critique of the doj’s  guidelines project 
Regardless of its motives, the Justice Department’s effort to promote rigid 
“compliance” with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—to the degree it had any 
effect at all—would reinforce the most problematic features of the federal 
criminal enforcement system: its minimal political accountability and the 
related absence of adequate performance measures.83 
 
81.  See Att’y Gen. Alberto Gonzales, Sentencing Guidelines Speech (June 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2005/06212005victimsofcrime.htm (noting that 
loss of “mandatory guidelines system . . . threatens the progress we have made in ensuring 
tough and fair sentences for federal offenders”); see also David M. Zlotnick, The Future of 
Federal Sentencing Policy: Learning Lessons from Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guidelines 
Era, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 16 (2008) (describing the Justice Department’s reaction to 
Booker); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales 
Announces Expansion of Justice Department Efforts and Proposes New Legislation To Help 
Prevent and Combat Violent Crime (June 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/June/07_ag_398.html (proposing the Violent Crime 
and Anti-Terrorism Act of 2007).  
82.  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2007), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/finalamend07.pdf (amending § 2D1 and making the new 
Guidelines retroactive); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO § 1B1.10 REDUCTION IN 
TERM OF IMPRISONMENT AS A RESULT OF AMENDED GUIDELINE RANGE (2007), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/030308rf.pdf. It is worth noting that even as Attorney 
General Mukasey voiced opposition to the retroactivity provision, some U.S. Attorneys’ 
offices had already consented to retroactive application in several cases. See Richard B. 
Schmitt, Confusion Arises over Crack Cases, Mukasey and Some U.S Attorneys Are Not on the 
Same Page, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2008, at A14; see also United States v. Herndon, No. 
3:01CR00063, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22277, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Va. Mar. 19, 2008) 
(complaining that the U.S. Attorney’s “blanket objection in all cases” in which a sentence 
reduction based on the retroactivity provision was being considered “does not assist the 
court in making [a particularized determination], and, in fact hinders it”). 
83.  See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 609 (suggesting that the “two central truths of 
federal criminal law enforcement” are “a very small sphere of responsibility coupled with a 
very large sphere of jurisdiction”). 
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As Kate Stith has written, the notion of consistency is illusory even when it 
comes to judicial decisionmaking across federal districts.84 But at least the 
informational universe for assessing judges is a closed one. Not so for 
prosecutors, who play a leading role in the construction of this universe. In 
theory, federal enforcement agencies, such as the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, 
could play a significant role in ensuring consistency. Given that federal cases 
are generally a function of team production involving prosecutors and law 
enforcement agencies, it might be enough for Washington to monitor and 
regulate how cases get presented for prosecution.85 Yet in large swathes of the 
federal docket, the extent to which federal enforcement authority has been 
leveraged or outsourced through task forces, deputization, or other formal or 
informal mechanisms of collaboration with the local police86 means that the 
ties of agency field offices to local authorities have become particularly close—
and at the expense of centralized control. 
Is the reliance of U.S. Attorneys’ offices on local informational networks 
and their close connection to the local politico-legal community a “bug” or a 
“feature” of the federal enforcement system? The question is relative because 
the very nature of a criminal justice project, which relies on localized 
investments in information gathering, and the very nature of the American 
adjudicatory process,87 which relies on local juries applying local norms, would 
engender connections to the local community irrespective of bureaucratic 
structure. Yet in the federal context—where the local prosecutors lack the 
political and legal independence that most district attorneys have in state 
systems88—the relationship between the districts and the center is open to 
manipulation at the margins and is worth considering as a normative matter. 
The “bug” position is implicit in many analyses of the federal enforcement 
bureaucracy and in the DOJ Guidelines project itself. And there is something to 
 
84.  See Stith, supra note 42, notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
85.  See Richman, supra note 8, at 808-09 (drawing on team production literature to understand 
relationships between prosecutors and law enforcement agents). 
86.  See MALCOLM RUSSELL-EINHORN, SHAWN WARD & AMY SEEHERMAN, FEDERAL-LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT COLLABORATION IN INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING URBAN CRIME, 1982-
1999: DRUGS, WEAPONS, AND GANGS (2000); see also Richman, supra note 32, at 394-407 
(pre-9/11 dynamic); id. at 408-15 (post-9/11 dynamic). 
87.  See Mirjan Damaška, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 
480, 511-15 (1975). 
88.  See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 
750 (1996) (discussing the lack of hierarchical authority that most state attorneys general 
have over local prosecutors); Richman, supra note 45, at 2064 (same). 
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be said for it. History is hardly a source of confidence in the suitability of the 
Department’s structure. With offices created at a time of minimal federal 
criminal enforcement activity,89 the U.S. Attorneys were not put under the 
supervision of the Attorney General until 1861,90 and the Justice Department 
was not created until 1870. The next hundred years saw the commitment of 
federal enforcement resources to a variety of new areas, with Congress and 
Presidents increasingly ready to target white slavers, bootleggers, highway 
gangsters, and big-city racketeers.91 But the federal portfolio remained small—
and activity within that portfolio spotty. The exception to all this was, of 
course, Prohibition, when the U.S. Attorney system faced its first extended 
challenge, with state and local enforcers perfectly happy to leave unpopular 
enforcement to federal authorities.92 During this period, by all accounts, 
 
89.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 435, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 
(2000)); DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801-1829, at 13 (1985); Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of 
American Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1 (1996); 
see also STEPHEN MIHM, A NATION OF COUNTERFEITERS: CAPITALISTS, CON MEN AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES 57 (2007) (suggesting that Jeffersonian Republicans’ 
distrust of centralized authority “may account for why the federal government did so little to 
prevent, prosecute, or punish counterfeiting of any sort in the years after 1800”). 
90.  See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation of 
Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming May 2008) (manuscript at 10, on file 
with The Yale Law Journal); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and The Democracy: 
Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. (forthcoming June 2008) 
(manuscript at 13-14, on file with The Yale Law Journal); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering 
American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1289-91 
(2006) (describing the status of the Attorney General at the time of the Founding). 
91.  See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Defining Federal Crimes 4 (Nov. 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
92.  See Lincoln C. Andrews, Prohibition Enforcement as a Phase of Federal Versus State Jurisdiction 
in American Life, 129 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 77 (1927) (complaining, as 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in charge of Prohibition, about the failure of state and 
local authorities to enforce Prohibition); Louis B. Boudin, The Place of the Anti-Racketeering 
Act in Our Constitutional-Legal System, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 261, 273-74 (1943) (describing how 
state and local authorities left Prohibition enforcement to the federal authorities); Robert 
Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State: 
Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2006); Albert E. Sawyer, The 
Enforcement of National Prohibition, 163 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 10, 11 (1932) 
(“[W]ith the steady enlargement of Federal police jurisdiction, culminating in the 
Eighteenth Amendment, has come the necessity for concerted action on the part of [the] 
heretofore entirely independent groups in the enforcement of a single law.”). The story 
before Prohibition is one of challenges that were regrettably not faced, like civil rights 
enforcement after Reconstruction, see ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-
1876 (1985); Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of 
1374.1418.RICHMAN.DOC 5/22/2008 5:28:53 PM 
the yale law journal 117:1374   2008 
1398 
 
dysfunction reigned. Forced to scale up their operations and perhaps not 
sharing Washington’s commitment to the project, U.S. Attorneys’ offices 
compromised cases at fire-sale prices.93 
Scale was not the only source of institutional tension within the 
Department during Prohibition, however. One vignette from New York City in 
1928 highlights the organic disjunction between local and national offices on 
issues of enforcement priorities, and in particular the way a U.S. Attorney’s 
office’s ties to local elites can moderate its commitment to a national program. 
During the quiet days of late August 1928, while U.S. Attorney Charles Tuttle 
was out of town, a special assistant reporting to Mabel Walker Willebrandt, 
the redoubtable Assistant Attorney General in charge of Prohibition 
enforcement, had grand jury subpoenas served on 125 “society leaders, bankers, 
police and prohibition agents said to have been patrons of twenty-six night 
clubs raided recently by the Federal dry forces.”94 Immediately upon hearing of 
this conspicuous shift to a demand-side strategy, Tuttle shut down the inquiry, 
declaring: “As long as I am United States Attorney here, . . . citizens will not be 
called in wholesale lots in this way. I am here to protect the citizenry of New 
York.”95 By the next day, Willebrandt had responded, insisting that Tuttle had 
known of the subpoenas. She declared, “Nothing will be allowed to handicap 
the Government’s investigation.”96 The inquiry went forward under 
Willebrandt’s direction, with Tuttle and his staff notably absent from the 
grand jury room. The New York Times observed, “It is believed here that a 
serious departmental situation would result if Mr. Tuttle should intervene in 
any way with the Grand Jury investigation. Heretofore, in controversies 
between Mrs. Willebrandt and United States Attorneys, the former has almost 
invariably been sustained.”97 A year later, however, the Times reported, “Mr. 
 
Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TULANE L. REV. 2113, 2133-66 (1993), and that did not 
substantially materialize—like sabotage and treason during the First World War. 
93.  See John F. Padgett, Plea Bargaining and Prohibition in the Federal Courts, 1908-1934, 24 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 413 (1990); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in 
Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 127 (2005) (“Apparently, in the liquor cases, 
federal prosecutors had to offer larger concessions in their recommended sentences before 
defendants would give up their valuable trial rights.”); see also Edward Rubin, A Statistical 
Study of Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 494, 497 tbl.1 (1934) 
(finding that in 1930, roughly sixty-five percent of the 87,305 federal criminal cases were for 
Prohibition violations). 
94.  Tuttle Halts Drive on Clubs’ Patrons; Scores Dry Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1928, at 1.  
95.  Id. 
96.  Mrs. Willebrandt Insists Tuttle Knew of Club Subpoenas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1928, at 1.  
97.  Willebrandt Aide Pushes Dry Inquiry in Spite of Tuttle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1928, at 1, 10.  
1374.1418.RICHMAN.DOC 5/22/2008 5:28:53 PM 
federal sentencing in 2007 
1399 
 
Tuttle won out, and the grand jury ended this phase of its work,” a victory that 
Mrs. Willebrandt later attributed to Tuttle’s “political ambitions.”98 
Following repeal, the federal prosecutorial establishment was able to return 
to its vagarious pursuits, with the “agenda” (a charitable description) reflecting 
enforcement agencies seeking to boost their statistics99 or status;100 the 
preferences of local U.S. Attorneys, and the occasional administration 
initiative.101 In 1976, a public administration scholar, having spent a year 
working in the Justice Department, concluded that “the federal justice system 
acts peculiarly as if it were a non-system.”102 He observed that “despite their 
apparent interdependence with each other—investigative, enforcement, 
prosecutorial, judicial, corrections, and parole segments of federal justice—the 
structured pressures of decentralized decision making allows [sic] for 
enormous independence and disparities among these Justice units.”103 
The last quarter of the twentieth century saw a dramatic expansion of the 
federal enforcement establishment and its ostensible responsibilities, 
particularly in the areas of white collar crime, narcotics, and violent crime. 
Perhaps the decentralization of the federal system itself facilitated this growth. 
This possibility seems particularly likely in the local corruption area where 
innovative prosecutorial theories—only later sanctioned by congressional 
action104—arose out of district experimentation in an enforcement space in 
 
98.  Tuttle Newcomer to Political Fray, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1930, at 4. U.S. Attorney Tuttle soon 
ran for governor of New York as an “outspokenly wet Republican” candidate against 
incumbent Democrat Franklin Roosevelt. MICHAEL A. LERNER, DRY MANHATTAN: 
PROHIBITION IN NEW YORK CITY 295 (2007). 
99.  EISENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 106 tbl.6.2 (1978) (showing that Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2311-13 
(1970), prosecutions constituted between a sixth and an eighth of all federal prosecutions 
between 1964 and 1970); Richman & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 614; Richard J. Stillman, II, 
The Bureaucracy Problem at DOJ, 36 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 429, 429 (1976) (noting “[p]ressure 
on FBI offices around the country ‘to make their statistics look good’”); see also JAMES Q. 
WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS 172 (1978) (noting 
how FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover touted Dyer Act (interstate car theft) statistics). 
100.  See Kathleen J. Frydl, Kidnapping and State Development in the United States, 20 STUD. IN AM. 
POL. DEV. 18, 20-44 (2006) (assessing J. Edgar Hoover’s “institutional transformation” 
achievements at the FBI during the 1930s). 
101.  See generally EISENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 76-100 (describing the dynamics of interaction 
between Washington and U.S. Attorneys).  
102.  Stillman, supra note 99, at 429. 
103.  Id. 
104.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000) (federal program bribery); 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000) 
(intangible rights deprivation as a basis for federal mail and wire fraud prosecutions); see 
also Richman & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 617. 
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which local norm-generation offered some insurance against federal 
overreaching.105 
Yet given that this scale-up was not accompanied by any significant change 
in the Justice Department’s structure, it is entirely possible that the present 
path-dependent U.S. Attorney scheme is just not “fit for purpose,” as the Brits 
are wont to say. The more that can be done to rein in these appendages, the 
argument goes, the better, particularly with respect to case selection and plea 
bargaining.106 To expand on Frank Bowman’s “sticker price” metaphor,107 one 
might see Washington facing all the problems endemic to a far-flung vertical 
distribution chain with franchisees that cannot be trusted to report and develop 
demand. After all, federal sentences are effectively the price at which federal 
prosecutors “sell” convictions. And resale price maintenance—which is one way 
of characterizing the Ashcroft Memorandum and the promotion of Guidelines 
“compliance”—might be one way of protecting the “quality” of federal 
prosecutions. By monitoring the kinds of cases brought by the districts and 
preventing line prosecutors from offering discounts, Washington can ensure 
that prosecutors, forced to demand full price from defendants, will invest more 
in making the cases.108 In this elegant, albeit surreal, model, defense lawyers 
are effectively recruited as quality monitors of prosecutorial efforts, as a 
prosecution will either lead to a full-price sentence or an acquittal. 
Another argument for maximal control from Washington was cogently 
made by Dan Kahan when he noted the risk of “prosecutorial overreaching” 
inherent in the U.S. Attorney system and the benefits that the reallocation of 
 
105.  See Sara Sun Beale, Comparing the Scope of the Federal Government’s Authority To Prosecute 
Federal Corruption and State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising Conclusions and a Proposal, 
51 HASTINGS L.J. 699 (2000); Michael W. Carey, Larry R. Ellis & Joseph F. Savage, Jr., 
Federal Prosecution of State and Local Public Officials: The Obstacles to Punishing Breaches of the 
Public Trust and a Proposal for Reform (pt. 1), 94 W. VA. L. REV. 301 (1991-92); Charles F.C. 
Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement 
Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171 (1977). 
106.  For an argument along these lines, see Mark Osler, This Changes Everything: A Call for a 
Directive, Goal-Oriented Principle To Guide the Exercise of Discretion by Federal Prosecutors, 39 
VAL. U. L. REV. 625 (2005). 
107.  See Only Suckers Pay the Sticker Price: The Effect of “Fast Track” Programs on the Future of the 
Sentencing Guidelines as a Principled Sentencing System: Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 
(Sept. 23, 2003) (statement of Frank O. Bowman, III, M. Dale Palmer Professor of Law, 
Indiana University School of Law), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/9_23_03/
fbowman.pdf. 
108.  See Benjamin F. Blair & Tracy R. Lewis, Optimal Retail Contracts with Asymmetric Information 
and Moral Hazard, 25 RAND J. ECON. 284 (1994) (discussing joint-profit-maximizing retail 
contracts where the manufacturer can observe neither the level of service supplied by dealer 
nor the state of demand). 
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“lawmaking authority” to Main Justice would offer: “Distant and largely 
invisible bureaucrats within the Justice Department lack the incentives that 
individual U.S. Attorneys have to bend the law to serve purely local interests,” 
and “the Department is more likely than are U.S. Attorneys to internalize the 
social costs of bad readings.”109 Although Kahan made these points in the 
context of giving Washington greater control over how federal criminal 
statutes are interpreted, concerns about suboptimal U.S. Attorney drift might 
easily extend beyond statutory interpretation to federal prosecutorial discretion 
more generally. While U.S. Attorneys have some connection to local or 
national elected officials, the fact remains that only the President has direct 
political accountability for federal prosecutorial decision making, and the more 
taut the lines of control to his Attorney General and in turn to departmental 
supervisory minions, the better. 
But how does this political accountability actually work? On paper, the 
scheme is clear: “Our democratically elected representatives have decided to 
enact uniform national criminal laws to address national problems and enforce 
them with one voice through one agency—the U.S. Department of Justice.”110 
And the democratically elected President, generally through his Attorney 
General but perhaps directly, is charged with “taking care” that this occurs.111 
Yet even if one accepts these general propositions in support of broad 
centralized authority—and not everyone does112—one still needs to confront the 
fundamental truth about the current federal enforcement system: it is not a 
system at all, but in large part just an adjunct to state or, more often, local 
criminal justice systems.113 
 
109.  Kahan, supra note 17, at 497. 
110.  Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 137, 140 
(2005). 
111.  See Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 25, at 539.  
112.  See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003) (arguing that the “presidential control” 
model does not adequately protect against the arbitrary decisionmaking that would 
delegitimate agency action); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-
Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2080 (2005) (noting the “highly attenuated 
nature of electoral accountability”); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The 
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007). 
113.  See Daniel Richman, Response, Judging Untried Cases, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 219, 
222 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/issues/articles/154-1/Richman.pdf; see also Lisa L. 
Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A Case Study in 
Cooperation and Discretion, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 239 (2005); Gerard E. Lynch, Letting 
Guidelines Be Guidelines (and Judges Be Judges), OSCJL AMICI: VIEWS FROM THE FIELD (Jan. 
2008), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/blog/Articles_1/Lynch-final-12-28-07.pdf.  
1374.1418.RICHMAN.DOC 5/22/2008 5:28:53 PM 
the yale law journal 117:1374   2008 
1402 
 
Consider the current federal criminal docket. In fiscal year 2006, drug 
trafficking defendants comprised 34.6% of those receiving federal sentences 
(25,086 defendants out of a total 72,518), and firearm cases constituted another 
11.6% (8384 defendants).114 Most of the narcotics defendants were not 
international drug traffickers. A sampling of drug cases in 2005 found that 
76.5% of the crack cases were “neighborhood” or “local,” as were 25.8% of the 
powder cases. This already reflected a shift on the powder side from street-level 
dealing to wholesaling between 2000 and 2005.115 The prevalence of firearms 
cases reflects the Bush Administration’s (and before it, the Clinton 
Administration’s) commitment to street violence programs coordinated with 
local police departments.116 As for the 1166 robbery defendants who comprised 
1.6% of all federally sentenced offenders in 2006, a review of the reported cases 
leaves one hard pressed to figure out what is essentially “federal” about the 
robberies that are pursued by AUSAs.117 Moreover, any effort to separate out 
what would otherwise be indistinguishable “local” cases from obviously 
“federal” cases is likely to undercount the former. What, for example, is one to 
make of the 1293 (1.8% of the 72,518 federally sentenced offenders) 
pornography/prostitution defendants, the 1714 (2.4%) larceny defendants, or 
even the 6958 (9.6%) fraud defendants, since “[w]hat constitutes a major 
 
114.  See 2006 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N ANNUAL REPORT, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/table3.pdf; see also 2006 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT 14 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/reading_room/
reports/asr2006/06statrpt.pdf (showing that all drug crimes, including possession and 
trafficking, constituted 26.2% of federal criminal cases filed in FY2006, and violent crime 
constituted 18.6%).  
115.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING 
POLICY (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/cocaine2007.pdf; see also 
United States v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (noting how the DEA 
and the Osceola County Sheriff’s office, “[a]pparently frustrated with the state’s lenient 
treatment” of the defendant, “for many years, a petty drug dealer,” arranged for an 
undercover agent to buy crack from him), vacated, 456 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2006). 
116.  See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, PSN IN PRACTICE II (2006), available at 
http://www.psn.gov/pubs/pdf/PSN_InPracticeII.pdf; Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended 
Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming 
Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2002); Richman, supra note 22, at 379-85; Richman, 
supra note 32, at 396-98. 
117.  See, e.g., United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2007) (robbery for drugs and drug 
proceeds); United States v. Jimenez-Torres, 435 F.3d 3 (1st Cir. 2006) (home invasion, 
robbery, and murder of a gas station owner); United States v. Turner, 272 F.3d 380, 384-85 
(6th Cir. 2001) (robbery of an illegal lottery operator; convictions reversed for lack of 
interstate commerce nexus). 
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fraud in one district may not be a big deal in another”?118 That there are no 
certainties in this regard reflects another fundamental truth about current 
enforcement realities: no citizen or scholar has a good idea of exactly what 
federal enforcement resources are deployed and to what end.119 
The story of how we came to this point has been extensively told 
elsewhere120 and is frequently followed by a normative analysis of why the 
extension of federal enforcement activity into areas of traditional local concern 
is an abuse of Commerce Clause authority, an affront to federalism, and a 
source of unnecessary jurisdictional conflict. No such normative claims are 
made here. Recognizing that a large chunk of federal enforcement activity is 
simply aid-in-kind to localities, for which federal elected officials are often 
eager to take credit,121 ought to be the beginning, not the end, of the analysis. 
After all, criminal charges can be as much an information-gathering tool as a 
deterrence and incapacitation mechanism. In the absence of frictionless 
institutional coordination across jurisdictions or even across agencies, even 
quintessentially “federal” investigations into large-scale interstate or 
international criminal enterprises will often take root from ostensibly “local 
crime” prosecutions. Moreover, to the extent that federal prosecutors are 
targeting street crime in and of itself, one might still see the value of using 
federal enforcers as a “strategic reserve”122 against local bad guys. In any case, 
pork is in the eye of the beholder.123 
The point—here, at least—is not that federal prosecutors ought to avoid 
bringing these otherwise local cases, but rather that the idea of consistency and 
uniformity across these cases nationwide is an odd one.124 The defendants are 
 
118.  Voreacos & Van Voris, supra note 31 (quoting Leslie Caldwell, former head of the Enron 
Task Force); see U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS tbl.3 (2006), available at http://sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdf/articles/2007/
Apr2007/document03.pdf.  
119.  See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 613-15. 
120.  See Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law Enforcement, 
in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: BOUNDARY CHANGES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS 81 
(Charles M. Friel ed., 2000); Richman, supra note 32, at 382-407. 
121.  Richman, supra note 12, at 786; Richman, supra note 32, at 401-02. 
122.  Richman, supra note 22, at 405. 
123.  See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A 
Generalization, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96 (1981). 
124.  See Jeffrey S. Sutton, An Appellate Perspective on Federal Sentencing After Booker and Rita, 85 
DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 91 (2007) (“Anyone interested in balancing consistency with 
individualized sentencing ought to acknowledge that the task is harder for the Federal 
Government than for a State, and ought to keep that in mind each time someone proposes 
federalizing a new area of crime.”). 
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indistinguishable from those sentenced in the local courts, which themselves 
are governed by state schemes with their own peculiar local disparities. The 
selection process that puts these defendants in federal court may be a matter of 
happenstance (e.g., the victim called the feds rather than the locals), 
idiosyncratic coordination between federal and local authorities, or random 
dipping by federal officials into the inexhaustible local pool.125 And the futile 
efforts of Washington to supervise the federal death penalty126—where the 
number of cases is lower, the stakes higher, and the political will likely 
greater—should leave no doubt about Washington’s inability to monitor the 
selection process of these noncapital cases across districts. 
It is troubling enough when, in the face of this inability, Washington 
grades districts by the number of cases they bring. The Main Justice 
apparatchiks who tried to identify “underperforming” districts based on the 
number of federal gun prosecutions127 may have simply sought to ensure that 
one of several federal enforcement priorities was pursued with adequate zeal 
nationwide. But the availability of an easily satisfied performance metric—there 
will often be, after all, an inexhaustible supply of gun cases—will skew a 
compliant manager’s attention away from those aspects of his job less 
amenable to quantification.128 And for U.S. Attorneys interested in hitting the 
numbers, that would mean diminished attention to the kinds of investigations 
for which numerical targets are less likely to be set, like complex fraud and 
corruption cases. 
 
125.  See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 
HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1159 (1995) (discussing then-U.S. Attorney Giuliani’s “federal day” 
program); see also United States v. Cherer, 513 F.3d 1150, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (Noonan, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (“The paucity of [sexual offense cases in Sentencing 
Commission database] is accounted for by the limited number of places under federal 
jurisdiction where sex crimes could occur.”). 
126.  See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. 
127.  See Memorandum from John S. Irving, Counsel to Deputy Attorney Gen., to Paul McNulty, 
Deputy Attorney Gen. 22 (Mar. 6, 2006), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
Printshop.aspx?Section=411 (DOJ document set eight) (“While prosecution statistics alone 
were never meant to be the sole measure of district performance, they have evolved into a 
benchmark. This is in part because prosecution numbers have been increasing at such 
astronomical rates that they have been convenient tools to illustrate the Department’s PSN 
efforts.”). 
128.  See Avinash Dixit, Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review, 37 
J. HUM. RESOURCES 696, 722 (2002) (“Most incentives schemes are designed to focus on the 
few dimensions thought of by the policymaker. But the agents respond by changing their 
activities in all dimensions, and the effects on the other dimensions affect some other 
principals or stakeholders adversely.”). 
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To require national consistency, however quixotically, in how these 
fungible local cases are handled once brought is simply to increase the level of 
dysfunction.129 While as offenders, the defendants in these cases might be 
indistinguishable from those prosecuted in state court, their selection (for 
whatever reason) for federal “treatment” places them within the ambit of a 
boutique system in which calls for toughness are loud and the sounds of real 
people faint. It is hard enough to assess the efforts of the federal government in 
such clear priority areas as counterterrorism and corporate fraud. How can one 
possibly expect political accountability to hold sway when it comes to street 
crime? In this realm, neither federal legislators nor enforcers will be held 
responsible for the crime rate. Those offenders who are prosecuted federally 
can be made politically valuable examples by a jurisdiction that lacks the 
budgetary pressures faced by state and local authorities.130 Indeed, because 
federal sentences are essentially a variant of local pork, the tendency of federal 
legislators seeking to benefit their districts will be to “overspend.”131 And these 
defendants will seem so much more menacing than the nonviolent offenders 
who populate most of the federal docket. 
Viewed from this perspective, the extent to which U.S. Attorneys’ offices 
are embedded in the local legal-political economy is a source of needed 
modulation, not regrettable disparity. U.S. Attorneys’ offices have their own 
reasons to push for maximal sentencing. This, after all, is how they get their 
leverage to obtain cooperation or quick guilty pleas from defendants. But they 
are also subject to balancing factors like local exigencies, the interests of local 
enforcement officials, community preferences (which might be expressed in 
judge and jury receptivity), and the immediate availability of local criminal 
justice systems as reference points.132 If one is looking for accountability in the 
kinds of cases discussed here, it is far better to embrace the derivative 
accountability that arises out of the network of connections a U.S. Attorney’s 
office has to its district than the ostensibly direct accountability that runs from 
 
129.  See Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 25, 61 (2005) (“Something might even be said for reasonable variations 
among methodologies and/or outcomes by federalizing federalism, viewing individual 
circuits and even districts as pseudo-states within the federal system.”). 
130.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 806-12 (2005) (comparing 
criminal justice budget pressure on states to that faced by federal authorities). 
131.  See Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Centralized Versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public 
Goods: A Political Economy Approach, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 2611 (2003). 
132.  See Gleeson, supra note 75, at 1714 (“[I]f the U.S. Attorney and federal law enforcement 
agencies determine that law enforcement needs in the district require the diversion of 
resources to particular cases or investigations, offering favorable plea bargains to avoid time-
consuming trials of unrelated cases is an entirely acceptable means of doing so.”). 
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a U.S. Attorney through the Attorney General to the President. It is only this 
network of district connections that will hold a U.S. Attorney’s office’s feet to 
the fire in any meaningful way that goes beyond case counting. 
Dan Kahan was surely right to suggest that Main Justice will do better than 
the scattered U.S. Attorneys’ offices at internalizing the costs of prosecution 
theories that can chill viable economic conduct and even, perhaps, political 
expression. But when it comes to the prosecution of street crime, low-level 
drug crime, and so much of the other “local” crime that finds its way into U.S. 
Attorneys’ offices, the federal deterrence message and the real nature of federal 
responsibility are likely to be noise swallowed up by local enforcement choices. 
Practically speaking, the only performance metric will be within the contours of 
the case brought, and there almost always will be a conviction, probably on a 
guilty plea, because of the resources the feds can bring to bear and the 
discounts offered to those who so plead or cooperate against others. Federal 
officials will be happy to take some credit for helping (a lovely, vague word) to 
reduce the crime rate when it is falling, but there will be no large-scale 
internalization of the costs of a few high sentences. Those most aggrieved—the 
unlucky defendants and, to a lesser degree, the federal courts133—will be hard 
pressed to shift the costs they bear. 
Need the choice between district variation and top-down control be so 
stark in this area? Perhaps not, at least to the extent that one envisions a new 
governance model unfolding across the federal enforcement bureaucracy, with 
Washington fostering experimentation in the districts and promoting the “best 
practices”134 that will put local knowledge in the service of broad, national 
goals. But this cannot happen without agreed upon and determinable 
performance metrics, something we have never had in the federal criminal 
 
133.  See Richman, supra note 32, at 402-04 (discussing burdens placed on the federal judiciary 
and the response to them). 
134.  See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist 
Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000) (arguing that drug treatment courts are a 
harbinger of open and evolving experimentalist institutions); Daniel Richman, Decisions 
About Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 
295, 327 (2008); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public 
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004) (describing the transition from top-
down, fixed rule bureaucracy to an experimentalist approach); William H. Simon, After 
Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1453, 1469-70 (2006) (“Prosecutors should articulate standards for the exercise of 
discretion, measure their own performance under the standards, provide transparent 
procedures for revising the standards in the light of experience, and provide remedies for 
targets that believe they have been harmed by violations of the standards.”). 
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justice system, particularly with respect to street crime.135 Even to the extent 
that a crime drop can be fairly attributed to an enforcement program,136 
questions will remain about the federal role in that program—questions for 
which the responsive information will be controlled and generated by local 
authorities, particularly the ones who benefit from the federal intervention.137 
At any rate, no one would accuse the Ashcroft Department of experimentalist 
tendencies. And had its top-down effort to curb sentencing flexibility in the 
districts been successful, the policy would have driven discretion down to the 
intake level—the least transparent part of the adjudicative process—in those 
cases where the exercise of enforcement discretion is most in need of 
regulation. 
Where there is some structural integrity to the federal “beat”—put 
differently, where federal responsibility for pursuing criminal activity is clear 
and where discretionary decision making by an AUSA is not the sole origin of a 
case’s designation as “federal”—the arguments for centralized management are 
far stronger. Here is where, for better or worse, Washington is more likely to 
bear the costs of enforcement decisions across districts since one can at least 
conceive of performance metrics based on something other than adjudicative 
success. These will, not coincidentally, also be cases in which the diffuse 
benefits engendered by the enforcement program of which they are a part have 
led to either the explicit reservation of prosecuting authority to the federal 
government or to a simple lack of interest or capacity on the part of state and 
 
135.  See Daniel Richman, Institutional Competence and Organizational Prosecutions, 93 VA. L. REV. 
IN BRIEF 115 (2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p
=2007/06/18/richman.  
136.  See also Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: 
Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 223 (2007); 
Philip J. Cook, Assessing Urban Crime and Its Control: An Overview 15-19 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13,781, 2008) (reviewing efforts to evaluate policing 
programs), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13781; cf. Richman, supra note 32, at 
400-01 (noting the debate about the role that federal COPS funding played in the national 
crime drop). Compare Steven Raphael & Jens Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements: The 
Case of Project Exile, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 251 (Jens 
Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (finding that Project Exile had little or no effect on 
Richmond’s homicide rate), with Richard Rosenfeld, Robert Fornango & Eric Baumer, Did 
Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile Reduce Homicide?, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 419, 436-38 
(2005) (finding a decline in crime in Richmond after Project Exile). 
137.  See Rubin, supra note 112, at 2126-29 (discussing a superior’s choice between procedural and 
substantive accountability standards, and noting the pitfalls of each). For discussion of DOJ 
accountability efforts in Project Safe Neighborhoods, see Edmund F. McGarrell, Strategic 
Problem Solving and Project Safe Neighborhoods (Dec. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www1.cj.msu.edu/~outreach/psn/Strategic_Problem_Solving_PSN_WP1
%5B1%5D.pdf. 
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local authorities. Conversely, the federal government may bring special 
competences to the program, because of its ability to invest resources 
selectively, its transnational range, and its unique ability to coordinate 
nationwide activity—all competences that rely to some extent on centralized 
control. 
Interestingly enough, in immigration, the largest category of cases138 in 
which federal responsibility is clear, even the Ashcroft and Gonzales Justice 
Departments were not averse to interdistrict variation. In those high-volume 
districts in which U.S. Attorneys’ offices had to act like local prosecutors—with 
possible performance metrics and an indefeasible political obligation to pursue 
cases—the rigors of the Ashcroft Memorandum and the ostensible allegiance to 
national uniformity soon gave way to “fast-track” programs that offered deep 
discounts to defendants willing to enter quick guilty pleas.139 Put differently, 
where AUSAs exercised less discretion on case intake, they were allowed more 
discretion in case disposition. To be sure, even as it pushed districts to bring 
immigration prosecutions,140 the Justice Department retained control over 
licenses for such programs, since no district could invoke this rubric as a basis 
for sentencing departures in the absence of explicit Justice Department 
authorization.141 But the history of “fast-track” immigration programs suggests 
that where the federal system has some structural integrity (i.e., clear 
responsibility), we can expect a degree of responsiveness to local conditions 
across districts. 
Where does this leave white collar crime? When we think in terms of 
institutional design, should it be treated more like violent crime or more like 
 
138.  2006 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 14. 
139.  See United States v. Mejia, 461 F.3d 158, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that fast-track 
programs are a permissible exercise of prosecutorial discretion); Charging, Plea and Early 
Disposition Policies: Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Sept. 23, 2003) (statement of 
Paul Charlton, U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona) (stating that “fast track” programs 
are reserved for “exceptional circumstances, such as where the resources of a district would 
otherwise be significantly strained by a persistently large volume of a particular category of 
cases, or where state or local prosecution is unavailable or unlikely”); see also Barrueco, supra 
note 57; Bibas, supra note 110, at 148 (describing congressional control of fast-track 
programs); Bowman, supra note 42, at 1339 n.113 (discussing the creation of fast-track 
programs). 
140.  See Memorandum from Daniel Friedman, Counsel to the Deputy Attorney Gen., to Paul 
McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen. (May 26, 2006), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
Printshop.aspx?Section=411 (DOJ document sets 11-4 to 11-5). 
141.  By August 2006, fast-track authority had been given to, among other districts, the District 
of Kansas for “fraudulent document use to gain employment.” See Memorandum from Paul 
McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Various U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 3, 2006), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/Printshop.aspx?Section=411 (DOJ document set twenty-seven). 
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immigration? The answer turns on the degree to which there is a coherent 
federal program cutting across districts with ascertainable responsibilities and 
spillover effects. That some nonviolent malfeasance can be charged as mail or 
wire fraud certainly does not mark it as identifiably “federal.”142 Yet there is a 
strong argument for consistent cross-district federal white collar enforcement 
of some prespecified (or at least conceptually clear) classes of cases in support 
of a national deterrence model. 
Federal income tax evasion cases are one obvious class of such cases.143 
Others might include accounting fraud in publicly traded companies, insider 
trading in the shares of such companies, and other similarly unsurprising 
categories of offenses with clear national market implications. Were interested 
observers—legislators, corporate executives, and others—to have a sense of the 
federal project in this area, accountability and deterrence might well be 
promoted through national consistency in sentencing. Such uniformity would 
also have a salutary tendency to remove venue selection incentives from the 
government when it decides whether, say, a corporate fraud case should be 
brought in the district where the corporate headquarters is located or in the one 
where the bulk of the employees who lost their jobs as a result of the fraud live 
and work. Is it possible that efforts to reduce inter-district variation in this area 
would lead to inappropriately high sentences for certain white collar 
defendants, particularly those with the temerity not to either cooperate or at 
least plead guilty with alacrity?144 Perhaps. The analysis here provides no direct 
answer to those troubled by the sentence given to Jamie Olis.145 But the 
 
142.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427 (1998); Richman & Stuntz, supra note 91, at 7. 
143.  See United States v. Cutler, No. 05-2516, 2008 WL 706633 (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 2008). In the 
course of reversing a below-guideline sentence on the government’s appeal in a bank fraud 
and tax evasion case, the panel quoted Sentencing Commission commentary: “Recognition 
that the sentence for a criminal tax case will be commensurate with the gravity of the offense 
should act as a deterrent to would-be violators.” Id. at *26 (quoting the introductory 
comment to chapter 2, Part T of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).  
144.  See Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 721, 737 (2005). 
145.  Olis, a mid-level executive at Dynegy, initially received a sentence of more than twenty-four 
years after going to trial in an accounting fraud case. Id. at 727-28; see also United States v. 
Olis, 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (reversing Olis’s sentencing); Kathleen F. Brickey, In 
Enron’s Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397 (2006); 
Samuel W. Buell, Reforming Punishment of Financial Reporting Fraud, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1611, 1629-30 (2007); cf. Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. 
L. 27 (2008) (discussing the claim that corporate law has been “overcriminalized”). Olis 
eventually received a non-Guidelines sentence of six years’ imprisonment. United States v. 
Olis, Crim. No. H-03-217-01, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68281 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006).  
1374.1418.RICHMAN.DOC 5/22/2008 5:28:53 PM 
the yale law journal 117:1374   2008 
1410 
 
systemic goal should be to have federal corporate crime enforcement and 
sentencing reflect legitimate assessments by politically responsible officials 
about the threats posed by corporate fraud.146 And it is inevitable that, in the 
absence of a long-term consensus on the matter, there will be under- and 
overreactions. The concerns expressed by the recent “Interim Report of the 
Committee On Capital Market Regulation”147 that federal public enforcement 
activity might drive market activity overseas may bear reassessment in light of 
the role that under-regulation may have played in the current credit crisis.148 
Yet the notion that centralized federal actors ought to and are the best placed to 
set the level and nature of prosecutorial activity in this sensitive policy area 
seems right. 
It should be clear by now that my measured embrace of decentralization in 
federal criminal enforcement is historically contingent and politically 
contestable: to the extent the DOJ were to commit itself to some national 
outcome measure that went beyond cases brought and dispositions obtained, a 
considerable degree of centralized control would make sense. It certainly made 
sense for the Secret Service and the Treasury Department to preside from 
Washington over the treatment of counterfeiting during the critical decades 
following the creation of a national currency and the establishment of the 
Secret Service.149 And although any effective domestic intelligence network will 
inevitably have to rely on state and local authorities for information gathering 
and dissemination (and will therefore need to be sensitive to the concerns of 
 
146.  See Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Curious History and Distressing 
Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines 
Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373 (2004); Buell, supra note 145, at 1612 
(“In a federal system of policing and punishing financial fraud, concerns include that 
uncoordinated actions of multiple sanctioning authorities could lead to over-sanctioning of 
fraud, resulting in over-deterrence and unjust punishment. Additionally, lack of 
coordination could lead to discord and confusion in the expressive effects of punishing 
white-collar crime. These concerns cannot be addressed in the absence of rough consensus 
across jurisdictions, around a focal point in law, about scale and methodology for measuring 
and aligning a given group of cases eligible for punishment.”). 
147.  INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (Nov. 30, 2006), 
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf; 
see also Jenny Anderson, Sharply Divided Reactions to Report on U.S. Markets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 1, 2006, at C8. 
148.  See Edmund L. Andrews & Stephen Labaton, Split Is Forming over Regulation of Wall Street, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at 1 (noting political debate “over how to strengthen oversight of 
financial institutions after decades of deregulation”); Elizabeth Williamson, Political 
Pendulum Swings Toward Stricter Regulation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2008, at 1. 
149.  See MIHM, supra note 89, at 340-74 (recounting efforts of the Secret Service to protect 
federal currency after the introduction of greenbacks in 1861). 
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the periphery),150 the diffuse benefits flowing from counterterrorism 
prosecutions and the clear federal responsibility for them counsels a high 
degree of centralized control, or at least supervision. But in a world in which, 
even after the 9/11 attacks and the consequent prioritization of 
counterterrorism programs, street crime and other ordinary “local” criminal 
activity occupies such a large part of the federal criminal docket, the likely 
demise of DOJ’s Guidelines Project ought not be regretted. 
iv. the promise of the future 
To what extent can we expect the Supreme Court’s latest sentencing 
cases—Rita, Kimbrough, and Gall—to assist in an appropriate recalibration of 
the allocation of power between Washington and the districts, and between 
U.S. Attorneys’ offices and other district actors? 
Predictions are a challenge in this area. After all, the response of sentencing 
judges to the discretionary license offered by Booker has been rather measured. 
Of the 63,841 defendants sentenced between October 1, 2006, and September 
30, 2007, 61% received sentences “within guideline range,” according to the 
Sentencing Commission’s most recent report—a figure that becomes 
impressive when combined with the 25.7% who received “government 
sponsored below range sentences,” generally because of cooperation or fast-
track disposition.151 The effective “compliance” rate nationwide is thus 86.7%, 
with considerable inter-district and inter-circuit variation on the degree to 
which judges “comply” by sentencing defendants within the range specified by 
the Sentencing Guidelines. To be sure, the whole notion of “compliance” is 
dubious: the judge whose fact-finding is heavily influenced by her desire to 
give a defendant an inordinately high or low sentence will be “compliant” so 
long as she thereafter invokes the standard Guideline provisions; the judge 
who follows Booker and, after calculating the Guidelines sentence, carefully 
works through the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) is not. Nor is the judge who 
departs upward or downward based on a factor that even before Booker would 
have been easily accepted by an appellate court as a ground for departure. 
Moreover, certain institutional dynamics will continue to favor “compliance”—
as a matter of form, at least—particularly when it comes to downward 
departures. More and more judges have become accustomed to the 
 
150.  See Richman, supra note 32, at 422-26. 
151.  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER RELEASE 
1 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sc_cases/Quarter_Report_4th_07.pdf. 
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Guidelines.152 If the government is at all strategic in the downward departures 
that it appeals, the appellate docket will still be dominated by cases in which 
the sentencing judge might well have acted “unreasonably.” 
Yet the data so far may be a function of a number of factors likely to change 
in the near future. In a number of circuits, the strict appellate review given to 
non-Guidelines sentences can be expected to change in light of Gall and 
Kimbrough.153 After all, the Kimbrough Court noted that “as a general matter, 
‘courts may vary’ [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy 
considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines.”154 Such 
language from the Supreme Court recently led a Fifth Circuit panel to observe 
in the course of affirming an upward departure, that the “argument that a 
disagreement with the Guidelines is not a sufficient reason to impose a non-
Guidelines sentence has lost most of its force.”155 
The reviewing hand may lighten even in circuits that have not been so 
strict.156 Consider United States v. Cavera, where a Brooklyn district judge had 
sentenced a gun trafficking defendant with a recommended Guidelines range 
of twelve to eighteen months to a substantially higher non-Guidelines sentence 
of twenty-four months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.157 
Noting that New York state law would have given the defendant and his co-
defendant a “substantially more severe sentence than that called for by the 
Guidelines,” Judge Charles P. Sifton observed that the “disparity created by 
imposing a longer sentence for firearms trafficking into large metropolitan 
 
152.  Indeed, an impressive level of “compliance” might have been obtained even had the 
Guidelines been advisory from the start. See John F. Pfaff, The Continued Validity of 
Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 235 (2006) (presenting state data suggesting that voluntary guidelines can reduce 
sentencing variation). 
153.  For a helpful survey of the recent cases, see Memorandum from Jennifer Coffin to Nat’l Fed. 
Defender Sentencing Res. Counsel (Jan. 16, 2008), available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/
case%20review%20post%20gall_kimbrough%201_16_08.pdf; see also United States v. Carty, 
No. 05-10200, 2008 WL 763770 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2008); United States v. Williams, 517 
F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2008).  
154.  128 S. Ct. 558, 570 (2007) (citing Brief for United States at 16, Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558 (No. 
06-633) (alteration in original)). 
155.  United States v. Herrera-Garduno, No. 07-40327, 2008 WL 625010 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2008). 
156.  Only 50.6% of sentences in the Second Circuit are “within Guidelines range.” See U.S. 
SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 151, at 2. 
157.  United States v. Lucania, 379 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (Sifton, J.), rev’d sub nom., 
United States v. Cavera, 505 F.3d 216 (2d Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit is considering 
Cavera en banc. Twelve years earlier, Judge Sifton had expressed his views on local variation 
in Charles P. Sifton, Theme and Variations: The Relationship Between National Sentencing 
Standards and Local Conditions, 5 FED. SENT’G RPTR. 303 (1993). 
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areas such as New York City is at least as well justified as the disparity created 
by . . . fast-track programs.”158 Indeed, he noted, the rationale for fast-track 
programs—“the limited resources that certain judicial districts have in relation 
to their overwhelming caseloads”—“is an ‘extra legal’ consideration only 
arguably related to the purposes of criminal sentencing.”159 In contrast, the 
imposition of “[l]engthier sentences based on an increased likelihood of harm 
in a given locality . . . is tied to the congressionally authorized purposes of 
sentencing contained in § 3553(a) such as providing adequate deterrence and 
reflecting the seriousness of the offense.”160 
On appeal, a Second Circuit panel reversed. Rejecting the district court’s 
effort to draw support for the consideration of local conditions from the law 
relating to fast-track programs, the panel noted in its 2007 decision: “While 
fast-track programs forsake uniformity to obtain other benefits, congressional 
participation ensures that other goals of the SRA, including transparency, are 
preserved.”161 It concluded that the individualized sentencing allowed by 
Booker “does not authorize a district court to inject into sentencing decisions its 
policy preferences with respect to the category of offense in question or the 
kind of community in which it is perpetrated.”162 
Less than two months later, Kimbrough came down. There, a district judge, 
faced with a defendant convicted for trafficking in crack cocaine, had found 
that the guidelines-specified range of 228 to 270 months would have been 
“greater than necessary” to accomplish the purposes of sentences set forth by 
the Sentencing Reform Act.163 The court noted that the case “exemplified the 
‘disproportionate and unjust effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in 
sentencing,’”164 since, had the defendant been accountable for the same amount 
of powder cocaine (cocaine hydrochloride), his Guideline range would have 
been 97 to 106 months. In fact, the Guidelines, following the lead set by 
Congress in statutory provisions, generally “treated every gram of crack cocaine 
 
158.  Lucania, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 296, 297. 
159.  Id. 
160.  Id. 
161.  Cavera, 505 F.3d at 222. It seems odd for the court to focus on congressional participation 
when Congress’s involvement was limited to delegating power to the Attorney General to 
license fast-track programs. 
162.  Id. at 225; see also United States v. Cavera, No. 05-4591, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 13003, at *25 
(2d Cir. June 6, 2007) (Calabresi, J., concurring dubitante), opinion withdrawn by, substituted 
opinion, 505 F.3d 216 (2007). 
163.  Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 565 (2007). 
164.  Id. 
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as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine.”165 Bound by the statutory 
mandatory minimum provision to give 180 months, the district court gave that 
and no more.166 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that a 
reduction of sentence on these grounds was “per se unreasonable.”167 
At oral argument in the Supreme Court, commenting on the possibility 
raised by Justice Alito that one sentencing judge in a crack case might use a 
one-to-one ratio; another judge, twenty-to-one; the next, fifty-to-one; the 
next, eighty-to-one; and the next, one hundred-to-one,168 Justice Breyer 
suggested that it would “be the end of the Guidelines” if “every judge has his 
own view of policy and there is a vast range.”169 But when the case was 
decided, the only safeguards that the Kimbrough opinion itself offered against 
such policy fragmentation were snips of catechism from Booker: “Advisory 
Guidelines combined with appellate review for reasonableness and ongoing 
revision of the Guidelines in response to sentencing practices will help to ‘avoid 
excessive sentencing disparities.’”170 Perhaps when it decides the case en banc 
(oral argument was held on March 27, 2008), the Second Circuit will not 
explicitly repudiate Cavera in light of Kimbrough and Gall. But it should, since 
the “policy preferences” that the Cavera panel barred a sentencing judge from 
injecting into its sentencing decisions cannot persuasively be distinguished 
from those that the Supreme Court subsequently freed sentencing judges to 
consider in Kimbrough. 
Cavera was the product of a peculiar juxtaposition—a sentencing judge 
feeling liberated by Booker to consider local criminal justice norms and a U.S. 
Attorney’s office bound by the Justice Department’s mandate that prosecutors 
adhere to the Guidelines and maintain a studious disregard for such local 
circumstances. To what extent will such pairings continue to occur? The 
answer will in part come from district judges, who in the wake of Kimbrough 
and Gall may well play a larger role in the district enforcement ecology. Some 
judges will push the envelope. Thus, even before those decisions came down, 
Judge Jack B. Weinstein relied on Booker and invoked state enforcement norms 
when a drug addict defendant, on supervised release from a federal murder 
conspiracy conviction, was charged with violating his release terms after several 
 
165.  Id. at 567. 
166.  Id. at 565. 
167.  Id.  
168.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558 (No. 06-6330). 
169.  Id. at 14. 
170.  Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 573-74 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2004)). 
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state drug possession arrests.171 The New York State system, he noted, has 
drug treatment courts designed to divert offenders with drug addictions away 
from incarceration; the federal system lacks such a program. When considering 
“the impact of sentencing on specific and general deterrence and on reducing 
recidivism rates,” he reasoned, “state-vertical coordination is more important 
than national-horizontal uniformity.”172 Moreover, taking account of “the 
disparity between state and federal sentences” would also address “the concern 
that the federal courts are overwhelmed with matters that can and should be 
tried in the states.”173 And it would “moderate the power of prosecutors to 
whipsaw defendants—federal prosecutors intervening in state matters, and 
state prosecutors threatening deferral to federal prosecutions with the prospect 
of higher sentences.”174 On these grounds, Judge Weinstein “deferred,” to state 
authorities and adjourned the federal proceeding for a year.175 While Judge 
Weinstein did not stand alone in his readiness to consider “vertical” disparities 
between federal and state sentencing practices in a particular locality,176 his 
remained the minority position when Gall and Kimbrough were decided.177 It 
remains to be seen whether circuit law will change in their wake. 
Yet the unresolved and probably more significant variable will be the 
positions that U.S. Attorneys’ offices take and the freedom that the Justice 
Department explicitly gives them.178 The extent to which U.S. Attorneys’ 
offices assist and even spearhead the movement of district judges into the legal 
space created by Gall and Kimbrough may end up being a function of how 
discretionary authority is generally allocated between the districts and the 
 
171.  United States v. Brennan, 468 F. Supp. 2d 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
172.  Id. at 407. 
173.  Id. at 406 (quoting Christine DeMaso, Note, Advisory Sentencing and the Federalization of 
Crime: Should Federal Sentencing Judges Consider the Disparity Between State and Federal 
Sentences Under Booker?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2128 (2006)). 
174.  468 F. Supp. 2d at 407-08. 
175.  Id. at 402. Although the precise legal basis for this “deference” is somewhat unclear, it does 
not appear that the government has appealed Judge Weinstein’s decision. 
176.  See United States v. Wilkerson, 411 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (remanding a case where the 
district judge expressed concern about disparate state and federal sentences but stated that 
the Guidelines barred consideration of that fact). 
177.  See United States v. Malone, 503 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases). 
178.  Those, like Doug Berman and a Harvard Law Review commentator who understandably 
bemoan circuit adherence to guidelines even after Rita, might welcome the encouragement 
and substantive contributions that prosecutors might bring to sentencing law development. 
See Douglas A. Berman, Rita, Reasoned Sentencing, and Resistance to Change, 85 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 7, 19 (2007); The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 245, 
252 (2007). 
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center in the new administration. What “lessons” about the virtues of district 
independence, if any, will be drawn from the Bush Administration’s travails 
remain to be seen. But there are strong arguments for the authorized 
collaboration of U.S. Attorneys’ offices with sentencing judges and appellate 
courts in the development of district-specific sentencing policy. One argument 
simply rests on institutional competence. With all due respect to Judge Sifton 
in Cavera and Judge Weinstein in Williams, district judge enforcement 
policymaking is bound to be less informed than it would be with prosecutorial 
input. So long as they do not use “national uniformity” as a substitute for 
nuanced analysis, prosecutors can also illuminate the effects of particular 
enforcement and sentencing policies outside of the district. 
A second argument rests on necessity: the collaboration is bound to happen 
anyway, and, in many cases, the issue is only whether prosecutorial input 
comes in the form of winks and nods or explicit policy articulation. Absent 
large-scale institutional change, line prosecutors will play a dominant role in 
the construction of the sentencing information universe, and their priorities 
and preferences will inevitably shape what is before a court. To this extent, 
they too may be beneficiaries of the advisory regime confirmed by Gall and 
Kimbrough, regardless of what authorization they have from their executive 
superiors. 
A principled argument for explicit collaboration between district judges 
and district prosecutors in the development of district-specific sentencing 
norms can also be made—one that draws on the pathologies179 of the federal 
enforcement “system” discussed above.180 Balance in a criminal justice system 
will inevitably be elusive when legislators or distant bureaucrats hurl 
sentencing numbers at crimes that are well worthy of their condemnation but 
for which they take scarcely any responsibility.181 Moreover, even were federal 
“uniformity” obtainable in the prosecution of such crimes, it would depend on 
 
179.  William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001); see 
also William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2008). 
180.  Given how U.S. Attorneys’ independence from Washington serves congressional purposes, 
see Richman, supra note 12, the Supreme Court’s sentencing cases may be likened to 
administrative law cases in which the Court, according to Lisa Schultz Bressman, “might see 
its role as mediating the needs of both political branches for control of agency 
decisionmaking, consistent with separation of powers.” Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures As 
Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1753 (2007). 
181.  For a nice example of federal sentencing numbers being thrown at a street crime problem, 
one need look no further than the story of the crack penalties. See David A. Sklansky, 
Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1296 (1995) (describing how the 
crack-cocaine ratio jumped from the 20:1 ratio proposed by the Reagan Administration to 
the 100:1 ratio proposed by the Senate Democratic leadership). 
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willful blindness to the world that exists behind the odd subclass of offenders 
caught in the federal beam. Let us, then, embrace rather then bewail the 
organic roots of U.S. Attorneys’ offices in the districts they serve, and see 
district courts as transparent sites for the development of sentencing norms 
that have some meaning beyond statistics maintained in Washington. 
What would the world look like were Washington’s fetters removed and 
line prosecutors explicitly licensed to join the rest of the courtroom working 
group in articulating sentencing norms? Even were the circuits to relax the 
virtually per se prohibition on the ad hoc consideration of local enforcement 
conditions, one would not expect prosecutors, as a starting matter, to seek or 
acquiesce in parity with state sentences—at least where those sentences are 
lower, as they usually are. The predictable sting of federal sentences may be the 
most potent information-gathering tool in the prosecutorial arsenal. And even 
in cases in which this leverage is not needed, a district has a strong incentive to 
protect the federal “brand” (its reputational capital among repeat-player 
defense lawyers) for use in cases where it is needed. Over time, however, where 
local sentences present ready comparators to judges and defense lawyers, the 
high Guideline sentences will no longer be so predictable, and prosecutors, 
having lost some of that advantage, might well see offsetting benefits in 
sentencing flexibility, which might allow them to handle more local cases. Or 
perhaps fewer, since in the absence of a clear federal sentencing premium, the 
federal forum might be less alluring for local enforcers. One need not spin out 
more hypothetical scenarios to see that each district and perhaps even each 
district judge will reach its own equilibrium, which will be a function of local 
conditions, bargaining strategies, and the ease with which resources flow 
between institutions (state and local, local and federal, prosecutors and police). 
At the very least, prosecutors will find it much harder to hide behind the 
Guidelines when defending their decisions to federal and local agencies, judges, 
defense lawyers, and perhaps even the public. 
Once locally focused federal enforcement activity is better grounded in the 
local criminal enforcement ecology, it is entirely possible that the in-kind 
contribution represented by federal adjudication and sentencing will be of less 
interest to local enforcers and of less use to federal officials. This would not be 
a bad thing, as it might recommit U.S. Attorneys’ offices to enforcement 
programs with more diffused benefits and help give the federal enforcement 
bureaucracy a clarity of mission that it has lacked for some time. This clarity of 
mission would also make the Justice Department’s political leadership far more 
accountable. And it would give the Department a far stronger justification for 
seeking sentencing “uniformity” across districts than it has had up to now. 
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conclusion 
What criminal enforcement concerns are “national” and which are merely 
“local”? The question has dogged courts and commentators since the Founding 
and has received renewed judicial attention since United States v. Lopez.182 Few 
would claim that the Supreme Court (or the lower courts) have had marked 
success since Lopez in drawing such lines as a constitutional matter.183 
Moreover, even to the extent lines could be drawn, deference to the political 
branches would require that the federal realm be defined expansively, with the 
inevitable inclusion of many offenses of the sort generally pursued by local 
enforcement authorities and for which the locals will be held responsible 
politically. 
That courts can play only a limited role in patrolling federal criminal 
jurisdiction as a statutory or constitutional matter, however, does not mean 
that they cannot contribute significantly to making federal authorities more 
accountable for their enforcement choices. And the federal courts have been 
given a significant tool to make such a contribution by the Supreme Court’s 
recent sentencing cases, which have freed judges to consider the interaction of 
federal and local criminal justice norms when imposing sentences. U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices—which have a long history of mediating between national 
priorities and local needs and norms—are perfectly suited to collaborate with 
sentencing judges in this institutional negotiation of what is “really” federal. 
The extent to which they will be permitted to play this role and how 
transparently they will play it will depend on how much Washington has 
learned from recent experience, and particularly from 2007, the year of the 
periphery. 
 
182.  514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (stating that the “scope of the interstate commerce power” should 
not be allowed to “effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is 
local and create a completely centralized government” (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937))); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a 
Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849 (1999). 
183.  See Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823 (2005). 
